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ABSTRACT  
Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) are of serious concern due to their 
adverse impacts on human rights and stability in host countries.  This thesis 
profiles three, so-called, durable solutions for refugees: local integration, third 
country resettlement, and voluntary repatriation. However, refugees living in PRS 
are not given any durable solutions, and they remain confined to refugee camps 
while the conflicts that forced them from their homelands continue. Refugees 
usually find themselves in PRS as a result of the restrictive policies of the country 
in which they have sought refuge.  These conditions not only deprive refugees of 
basic human rights, but act as catalysts for political violence, insurgency, and 
radicalization.   This thesis examines, in detail, one such case: Nahr al-Bared, a 
Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon where refugees have been living in PRS for 
decades due to stringent refugee policies that contributed to violent clashes that 
took place in May 2007.  The denial of human rights for Palestinians in Lebanon 
has effectively marginalized already disempowered refugee populations, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of instability and radicalization. The denial of rights, a 
lack of opportunities, and confinement to the poor conditions of the refugee camp, 
are driving forces of political violence and militant rhetoric. This situation can 
endanger the refugee host country as well as the refugees, who are civilians in 
need of international protection.  Therefore, there is a strong connection between 
the inclusion of rights for refugee populations in a host country, and peace and 
security.  The case of Palestinians in Lebanon is examined as a microcosm of the 
notion that human rights and state security are interdependent.  Recognition of 
  ii 
this interdependence necessitates a paradigm shift in perspectives and policies of 
international refugee protection and state security, from regarding PRS as an 
indefinite state of emergency to be contained, to acknowledgment that the 
indefinite duty to protect refugees in protracted situations simultaneously serves 
the host country‘s security concerns. 










To refugees who are living in a state of hopelessness around the world; you are 
not forgotten. 
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Note by the Author 
 At the outset of my research for this thesis, I sought to address the 
humanitarian concerns associated with refugees‘ prolonged confinement to 
camps.  The hopelessness of camp life, its imposed idleness and barren 
surroundings, is what compelled me to write on this topic.  Refugees living in 
these conditions are denied basic human rights, including medical treatment, the 
right to a livelihood, and education, the right to move freely, and to pursue their 
lives.  These oppressive conditions do not even ensure the safety and protection of 
refugees, which is the fundamental purpose of creating the legal status of 
―refugee.‖  In particular, I found the extended marginalization of Palestinian 
refugees throughout the Middle East, legally, socially, economically and spatially, 
to be the starkest example of the denial of human rights and protection to refugees 
in the world.  I found this refugee situation to be a troubling microcosm of a 
widespread global problem, prior to knowing that there was a term for this area of 
growing concern, namely, Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS).  Having worked 
with the refugee population in Arizona for several years, I found that my 
perspective, and often that of the refugee protection regime, is one of emergency 
and direct humanitarian assistance, rather than theoretical or academic approaches 
to solving problems.  This thesis attempts to address the human rights concerns of 
PRS through a legal framework, as this is the framework upon which the 
international refugee protection regime is built.  However, there are various lenses 
and theoretical frameworks through which this topic can be approached.  
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Practitioners in the field relay that it is commonplace for refugees to spend 
extended periods of time in the camp before they can be resettled in a safe third 
country or offered another durable solution.  The field of refugee protection and 
humanitarian assistance tends to focus on immediate emergencies and influxes of 
refugees into neighboring countries of a crisis, and yet, there is an understanding 
that refugees must await resettlement, meaning that there is a disjuncture between 
protection from emergencies to long-term situations.  However, extended waiting 
periods in which camp life shifts from a state of emergency to an indefinite 
reality, are not given due attention as humanitarian and protection concerns.  
Therefore, with this thesis, I attempt to address why PRS are problematic for host 
countries and for the wellbeing of refugees, in an effort to broaden the focus of 
international refugee protection to include those populations that live in an 
indefinite state of emergency, ironically administered by the host country, and a 
lack of durable solutions to their plight.  These circumstances elicit an upheaval of 
state responsibility in hosting refugee influxes, not as temporary occupants to be 
controlled, but as human beings in need of protection, however long that may be 
for.  Furthermore, it is in the national interest of security for host countries to 
locally integrate refugees, rather than to isolate them, as I later illustrate in the 
case of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  These are the concerns that compelled 
me to write on this topic, in the hopes that increased attention to this issue will 
one day affect change and bring about protection for refugees living in prolonged 
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hopelessness, that they may one day find refuge in a place that they can call home 























 Refugee crises frequently emerge as a result of conflict, giving rise to 
large influxes of people who are forced to flee across international borders, in 
search of protection.  Neighboring states then become hosts to refugee 
populations, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, which begs the question of state 
responsibility according to international law.  If states are to exercise sovereignty, 
by maintaining their borders and security, how does that conflict with the 
obligation to give refuge to those fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution or 
harm?  There is also the issue of state burden, and how much a state is expected to 
assist in the protection of refugees, particularly when the country that has agreed 
to grant protection to refugees, does not have the capacity to protect and provide 
for a refugee population in addition to its own nationals.  All of these issues bring 
into question the responsibilities of the state to host refugee populations, and how 
those responsibilities vary, depending on whether or not the state is a signatory of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, hereafter referred to as, 
―the Refugee Convention.‖    
While some states feel compelled to extend the rights afforded to nationals 
to the refugee population as signatories to the Refugee Convention, other states, 
which are not parties to the Convention, may not be as compliant.  Therefore, the 
benchmark for international refugee protection varies from state to state when 
dealing with non-signatories, being that states can make their own determinations 
as to the level of protection given to refugees, by nature of being a sovereign 
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state.  Through the principle of non-refoulement, however, a state cannot return a 
refugee to a country where he has a well-founded fear of persecution.  In order for 
states to realize the importance of providing protection to refugee populations in 
its territories, there must be a clear realization of its responsibilities and 
obligations to refugees, because this protection is central to the safety and security 
of the state, as well as to the protection of refugees.  The most visible and 
apparent applicability of these obligations is in the refugee camps in host 
countries, where conflict and sanctuary are simultaneously embodied.      
Of particular importance is the necessity of adhering to those obligations 
within the refugee camp in providing camp security and protection, and assuring 
that basic human needs are met for refugees.  However simple the concept of 
providing a safe-haven may seem, as a principle of humanitarianism, achieving 
this goal is much more complicated, especially in cases when a country is forced 
to host refugees by a mass exodus that it cannot contain, or when cross-border 
conflict permeates the refugee camp and puts the host country in the midst of an 
armed conflict.  As the nature of war and conflict has changed, there is a 
dwindling concept of war between two nations in which there is a buffer zone 
where civilians can take refuge.  War has become increasingly idiosyncratic, in 
which conflict can be between non-state actors, or may emerge from within the 
refugee camp itself.    
Conflict emanating from refugee camps threatens the rights to protection 
of refugees.  This leads to what is known as ―warehousing‖ refugees.  This term is 
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often used to describe what is formally known as Protracted Refugee Situations 
(PRS), in which camp life becomes much like a ghetto.  As will be described 
further in subsequent sections of this paper, there are three durable solutions for 
refugees; however, ―Refugee warehousing…has emerged as a de facto fourth and 
all-too-durable solution,‖ as it violates human rights and creates instability, says 
the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) in its 2004 report, 
World Refugee Survey (USCRI 2004, 38).  Examples abound, although the 
protracted Palestinian refugee crisis in the Middle East epitomizes the most 
poignant detrimental impact of warehousing refugees, which has the potential to  
create political instability, a breakdown in security, and the debasement of human 
rights wherever it is present.   
While countries aiming to preserve state sovereignty may engage in 
refugee warehousing to ensure stability and security, it is ironic that the 
conditions surrounding PRS are likely to be the root cause of instability and a lack 
of security.  Aside from these concerns by host governments, failing to address 
such crises are violations of human rights.  For the purposes of this discussion, the 
Palestinian refugee crisis in Lebanon will be analyzed as a microcosm of the 
global issue of camp violence and lack of rights for refugees as a result of 
Protracted Refugee Situations.  After examining the legal framework in place to 
protect refugees, the Palestinian refugee crisis in Lebanon will be examined, 
followed by recommendations regarding the duty of the state to protect refugees 
as a norm of international law.  Whether they are signatories to the Refugee 
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Convention, or not, states have duties to protect refugee populations across the 
world from the exemption of rights and protection, that are a direct result of 
instability and violence exacerbated by prolonged refugee crises in camps.  These 
conditions not only endanger refugee populations, but compromise state security, 
making it essential for a paradigm shift in international refugee protection that 
recognizes the necessity of addressing PRS as areas of concern for human rights 
and security.  Furthermore, it is essential to shift perspectives on the purpose of 
the refugee camp from an emergency holding block for an indeterminate amount 
of time, to a transitory space used to facilitate durable solutions for refugee 














Challenges to Refugee Protection 
Definitions 
When refugee crises occur, as a result of war or political tumult, human 
beings become the collateral damage and many are forced to flee.  People may 
become displaced within their own countries, making them internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), or they may flee the country entirely, making them refugees, 
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Regional Office for Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the South 
Pacific (2010).  The legal definition, which is the definition that will be used by 
the term ―refugee,‖ throughout this thesis, was clearly defined in the Refugee 
Convention.  Given the history and importance of the Refugee Convention in the 
realm of refugee protection, it is necessary to have a clear definition of what it 
means to be a refugee and the protections that status offers.  Article 1 (A) 2 
defines a refugee as a person who:  ―[O]wing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it‖ (UNHCR 2007a, 16).  By the Refugee 
Convention‘s definition, there are five criteria by which a refugee may make a 
claim of a well-founded fear of persecution: race, religion, nationality, 
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membership of a particular social group, and political opinion.  A refugee need 
only make a valid claim of one form of persecution to be considered for refugee 
status, not all five.    
Various political, economic, or cultural factors may cause individuals to 
flee.  Refugees typically find themselves in a country of refuge, via temporary 
protection in a second country, or host country.  It is also referred to as the 
―country of first asylum,‖ which the International Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC) defines as: ―A country in which an asylum-seeker has been granted 
international protection as an asylum-seeker or a refugee‖ (ICMC 2001).  
Refugees may also seek a more durable solution of permanent resettlement in a 
third country of asylum, but must wait in the host country for months or years 
before they can be permanently resettled, says the Human Rights Education 
Associates (HREA 2002).  Unfortunately, as a result of these extended waiting 
periods, there are many issues that can exacerbate tensions of the conflict in ways 
that jeopardize a refugee‘s protected status or safety.   
Key Challenges 
One of the key concerns that can put refugees‘ protection at risk are 
Protracted Refugee Situations, which will be a major barrier to refugee protection 
discussed throughout this thesis.  As described in the World Refugee Survey, in an 
article entitled, ―Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of 
Humanity,‖ ―Warehousing is the practice of keeping refugees in protracted 
situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependency – their lives 
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on indefinite hold – in violation of their basic rights under the [Refugee 
Convention]‖ (USCRI 2004, 38).  The UNHCR Global Consultations on 
International Protection assert that:  ―A protracted refugee situation is one where, 
over time, there has been considerable changes in refugees‘ needs, which neither 
UNHCR nor the host country have been able to address in a meaningful manner, 
thus leaving refugees in a state of material dependency and often without 
adequate access to basic rights (e.g. employment, freedom of movement and 
education) even after many years spent in the host country‖ (USCRI 2004, 38).  
PRS are barriers to refugee protection because they detract from the human rights 
owed to refugees living in them.  Refugees are not only deprived of rights in these 
situations, but they are put at risk as a result of the instability these situations 
create.   
What happens when the refugee camp in the host country is no longer 
safe? What can host countries do to protect civilians, and what causes these 
circumstances?  It is critical to explore the reasons behind the potentially 
destabilizing influence of influxes of refugees in a host country, as well as the 
host country‘s duty to protect refugee populations under international law.  
Another major factor to consider is whether or not a country is a willful host to 
refugee influxes and a signatory to the Refugee Convention, or a non-voluntary 
actor in a humanitarian crisis that cannot sustain the increased population.  
Although a variety of factors may lead to refugee populations, causing political 
tensions in a host country, it is the duty of the host country to protect those who 
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have a well-founded fear of return to their original homes, and to address the 
political, economic, or other factors that lead to instability in refugee camps, so 
that those camps are made safe for civilians and protected, as required by 
international law.   
Internal and External Factors 
There are many contributing factors to political instability in host 
countries as a result of an influx of refugees – some emanating from within the 
camp, and some penetrating the camp.  Being that host countries and the 
international community have a duty to protect refugees and to ensure the 
neutrality of the refugee camp, (UNHCR 1999) it is essentially a failure by the 
state, or an external factor that can lead to violence when the state fails to keep 
exiled combatants, war criminals, or militants, who do not qualify as refugees, out 
of the camp.  Another external factor is when the state does not want the refugee 
population to integrate with the society of the host country, as is the case with 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which leads to increased marginalization of the 
refugee population and a denial of their rights.  When the political tensions come 
from the host country itself, as a result of political opinions on the conflict itself, 
or as a result of societal attitudes, then it is a detrimental failure on the part of the 
state.         
Then there are the internal factors in which the political instability comes 
from within the camp itself.  It is not uncommonly the case that while in exile, 
refugees will develop particular political attitudes or opinions as a result of their 
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forced migration and subsequent captivity, as is frequently the case in PRS.  PRS 
entails extended periods of restricted movement and a complete dependency on 
the government or aid agencies, meaning that for refugees, their lives have not 
only been changed by conflict, persecution, and death, but then their entire 
livelihoods and ways of life are uprooted by camp life.  Some refugees may 
attempt to influence the political situation in their home country from within the 
camp by mobilizing armed groups or by spreading political rhetoric intended to 
motivate others to action.  As a result, the refugee camp becomes a hotbed for 
political, often violent, action sparked by those who were involved in the conflict 
that caused them to flee, or who were constituents of one of the factions or 
opposition groups.  Such an uprising from the camp can spill over and influence 
the politics of the host country, particularly when the host country is involved in 
the conflict or has political or diplomatic relations with the country of origin of 
the refugee population (Ek and Karadawi 1991).  In a situation such as this, the 
host country, and more specifically the refugee camp, can become a platform for 
political activities for exiled groups or opposition groups to launch attacks on the 
country of origin.  Whether or not the host country steps in is only a matter of 
whether the host country supports these political movements or wants to stifle 
them.  In the case of the former, refugees are at risk of being used as tools by the 
host country to make political or strategic gains on the country of origin of the 
refugee population.  Regardless, as a humanitarian space of sanctuary and 
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protection, refugees should never be used for political ends, and violence of any 
kind must be kept out of the camps as an obligation of protection.          
Political violence, upheaval, and rebellion are all potentially negative 
consequences that may arise out of a refugee camp, as a result of either internal 
(from the refugees in the camp itself) or external (the host country and its politics) 
factors that may lead to further or continued instability.  These issues will be 
looked at critically, and will be examined to determine the causes for these 
dynamics, as well as the duties of the state under international law, particularly 
when the host state is actively involved in the conflict, politically or militarily.  
The key illustration of this scenario that will be used as a focus for the discussion 
will be the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon.  Nahr al-
Bared depicts a climate of contradictory images of tumult and refuge; safety and 











A Legal Framework for the Problem: the Status of Refugees in International Law 
The Refugee Convention 
In order to accurately contextualize the problems and implications of 
Protracted Refugee Situations, and how the law relates to Lebanon‘s obligations 
to Palestinian refugees in its territory, it is necessary to have an understanding of 
refugee law.  Outlining a legal framework is essential to understanding the rights 
of refugees and the obligations of the state in receiving refugees in humanitarian 
crises.  The most important source of humanitarian and international law, 
particularly refugee law, emanates from the international community, namely, the 
United Nations (UN).  A crucial body of law pertaining to refugees is the Refugee 
Convention.  The Refugee Convention was adopted and opened for signature on 
July 28
th
, 1951, but was not entered into force until April 22, 1954 (UNHCR 
2007b, 4).  Work on the legislation to protect refugees began in the early 20
th
 
century through the efforts of the League of Nations, prior to the establishment of 
the UN.  At a UN conference, the Refugee Convention was signed in which the 
definition of a refugee was decided upon, as well as the type of legal protection 
that would be granted to refugees.  In addition, state parties decided which social 
rights and assistance would be guaranteed by states that became signatories to the 
Refugee Convention.  Interestingly, the Refugee Convention also outlines the 
obligations of the refugee to the host country (UNHCR 2007b, 4).  About six 
months earlier, on January 1, 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was established.  The Refugee Convention was originally 
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authored to protect refugees throughout Europe after the devastation of World 
War II (UNHCR 2007b, 5).  However, with the 1967 Protocol, hereafter referred 
to as ―the Protocol,‖ the protection of the Refugee Convention was extended to 
remove geographical and temporal restrictions (UNHCR 2010a).  As a result, 147 
states have acceded to the Refugee Convention and/or the Protocol, as of January 
1, 2008.  Yet, as the UN itself has pointed out, the relevance of the Refugee 
Convention has been called into question at times, due to the increased number of 
people who have migrated globally (UNHCR 2007b, 5).  Even so, the Refugee 
Convention has remained the primary source of refugee law that has served to 
protect refugees for decades.      
 There are several critical aspects of the Refugee Convention deserving of 
attention and international adherence.  One such aspect is Article 2 of the Refugee 
Convention, which outlines ―General Obligations.‖  Namely, every refugee must 
conform to the laws and regulations of the country where he has found refuge, 
and respect measures put in place to maintain public order (UNHCR 2007a, 18).  
This is an important article of the Refugee Convention, as it associates refugee 
protection with particular duties of those receiving protection, namely, the 
refugees themselves.  That is to say that while the state has an obligation to give 
safe-haven to refugees in its territory as a country of first asylum, refugees must 
also respect the state in recognizing that their status there is temporary until a 
durable solution is found, and that they must adhere to the laws of the host 
governments.  This also means that refugees are not at liberty to incite violence or 
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mobilize politically, if that will disrupt public order, to try to influence their home 
country‘s situation while in the territory of the host government.   
Another important principle of refugee protection is addressed in Article 
33 of the Refugee Convention on the ―Prohibition of Expulsion or Return 
(―Refoulement‖),‖ which is a foundational concept of refugee protection.  Article 
33 states:  ―No Contracting State shall expel or return (‗refouler‘) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion‖ (UNHCR 2007a, 32).  The principle 
of non-refoulement is a crucial concept in refugee law because it applies to 
signatories of the Refugee Convention as well as non-contracting states.  In other 
words, a party to the Refugee Convention is legally bound to its provisions, as it 
is an international treaty.  This also means that countries that are not parties to the 
Refugee Convention are also bound by the principle of non-refoulement, so if a 
refugee enters a country that has not signed the Refugee Convention, by 
international law, that country cannot deport or forcibly return the refugee to his 
country of nationality or habitual residence because of the principle of non-
refoulement.  Non-refoulement is generally considered to be a part of a customary 
body of law regarding refugee protection.   
 It is also important to note that a refugee cannot be reprimanded in a 
country of refuge if the refugee took flight and entered the country without proper 
documentation.  Article 31 states:  ―The Contracting States shall not impose 
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penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming 
directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of 
article I, enter or are present in their territory without authorization…‖ (UNHCR 
2007a, 31).  On that same line of protection, the UNHCR recognizes prima facie 
refugees.  While asylum-seekers must have their claims of well-founded fear 
evaluated, because they are based on individual persecution, refugees typically 
flee in mass movements as a result of armed conflict or violence.  Given the lack 
of capacity of most countries to individually assess asylum claims during this 
mass exodus, and taking into consideration that circumstances of armed conflict 
and violence are usually evident, large groups would be considered prima facie 
refugees without having been evaluated on the grounds of any asylum claims.  It 
is important to keep in mind that asylees are refugees, but they must have their 
claims evaluated, as opposed to refugees who flee a conflict or humanitarian crisis 
that is apparent, and therefore, does not need to be substantiated through 
individual interviews until they are processed for recommendation for 
resettlement or another durable solution by the UNHCR (UNHCR 2010b).  
According to the ICMC, this is also known as ―group determination of refugee 
status,‖ which they have defined as: ―A practice by which all persons forming part 
of a large-scale influx are regarded as refugees on a prima facie basis.  Group 
determination ensures that protection and assistance needs are met without prior 
individual status determination‖ (ICMC 2001).  The safeguards put in place by 
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, as well as the prima facie determination of 
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refugee status, protect refugees from refoulement, which is a central concern in 
terms of preserving the lives and liberties of refugees in harm‘s way.        
 While non-contracting states are still bound by international law to protect 
refugees, through the principle of non-refoulement, parties to the Refugee 
Convention have additional obligations to fulfill.  In host countries that are 
signatories to the Refugee Convention, refugees have many rights that a refugee 
would not likely find in a country that was not a signatory to the treaty.  
Specifically, refugees in contracting states have rights such as freedom of 
religion, freedom of movement, the right to employment, education, and travel 
documents.  In return, refugees are expected to uphold their end of the treaty 
obligations by respecting the laws and regulations of the host country and by 
cooperating with keeping the peace and public order (UNHCR 2007b, 7).       
 The obligations placed on state signatories are all-encompassing of 
―protection,‖ in the international legal sense.  The UNHCR states that protection 
includes the following: 
―A properly functioning government provides its citizens with a range of 
civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights and services including, 
for example, protection by the police, legislation and courts from crime 
and persecution.  If that system of ‗national protection‘ breaks down – 
either because the country is at war or is suffering from serious unrest, or 
because the government itself is persecuting certain categories of citizens 
– then people may flee to another country.  Those among them who 
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qualify as refugees are then entitled to receive ‗international protection‘‖ 
(UNHCR 2007b, 8). 
According to the UNHCR, it is the host government and the 147 signatories to the 
Refugee Convention that protect refugees, (UNHCR 2007b, 8) implying that non-
contracting states are also responsible for protecting refugees if they become 
hosts, voluntarily or involuntarily, to refugee populations.  If, however, a 
population is not being protected within the country of origin, then there is 
justification to flee, which further qualifies the population as refugees worthy of 
international protection.  Per the ICMC, the international protection of refugees is 
carried out through ―[i]nterventions by States or UNHCR on behalf of asylum-
seekers and refugees to ensure that their rights, security and welfare are 
recognised [sic] and safeguarded in accordance with international standards.  
Such interventions include: ensuring respect for the principle of non-refoulement; 
admission to safety; access to fair procedures for the determination of refugee 
status; humane standards of treatment; and the implementation of durable 
solutions.  UNHCR is the only United Nations agency with a mandate for the 
protection of refugees‖ (ICMC 2001).  The elements that comprise international 
protection are obligatory to the international community, as dictated by customary 
international humanitarian law.   
Customary International Humanitarian Law 
The ICMC defines customary international laws as ―International laws 
that derive their authority from the constant and consistent practice of States, 
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rather than from formal expression in a treaty or legal text. In order for State 
practice to contribute to the formation of customary international law, that 
practice should be conducted with a sense of legal obligation‖ (ICMC 2001).  
According to Rule 131 of the International Committee of the Red Cross‘s (ICRC), 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, ―In case of 
displacement, all possible measures must be taken in order that the civilians 
concerned are received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, 
safety and nutrition and that members of the same family are not separated‖ 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, 463).  What this means is that non-
contracting states also have a duty under customary humanitarian law to provide a 
certain standard of treatment of refugees, even if they have not subscribed to the 
Refugee Convention, which has provisions for respect for refugees‘ civil, 
political, economic, cultural and social rights.   
Durable Solutions 
Finally, protection must involve one of three durable solutions for 
refugees, advocated for by the UNHCR: voluntary repatriation, local integration 
and resettlement.  Voluntary repatriation is when a refugee voluntarily returns to 
her country of origin either through the concerned governments or the UNHCR, 
or through her own means because she feels safe enough to return (ICMC 2001).  
Local integration occurs when a refugee finds permanent settlement in a country 
of first asylum, (where he has been granted international protection as an asylum-
seeker or refugee) (ICMC 2001).  Lastly, resettlement in a third country is a 
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durable solution which is ―The transfer of refugees from the country in which 
they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The 
refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident 
rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalised [sic] 
citizens. For this reason, resettlement is a durable solution as well as a tool for the 
protection of refugees‖ (ICMC 2001).  These durable solutions are essential to 
refugee protection, particularly when refugees find only temporary protection in a 
state, which is ―An arrangement or device developed by States to offer protection 
of a temporary nature to persons arriving en masse from situations of conflict or 
generalised [sic] violence, without prior individual status determination. 
Temporary protection was applied in some Western European States for the 
protection of persons fleeing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s‖ (ICMC 2001).  Notable, however, is that nowhere is it permitted to 
maintain Protracted Refugee Situations as a solution to refugee crises.  PRS are 
indefinite, and result in conditions that deny rights to refugees, making those 
situations unacceptable for meeting international customary and legal standards of 
refugee protection.  Granted, countries of first asylum may only agree to 
temporarily protect refugees until they are resettled or voluntarily return home, 
and yet, the indefinite nature of refugee crises that are the result of conflict, makes 
it legally and morally contestable for states to deny refugees of their rights, 
including durable solutions.  At a minimum, host countries must make efforts to 
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offer local integration as a solution, at least until third country resettlement or 
voluntary repatriation become viable options.  
In looking at the legal frameworks in place to ensure refugee protection, 
through customary international humanitarian law and international treaties via 
the United Nations, it is clear that there are many remedies in place for refugees 
and asylees.  Some states that are not signatories to the Refugee Convention do 
not comply with customary humanitarian law in instances where refugees are 
turned away or are not provided for adequately.  In these instances, states are not 
always adherent to their obligations due to various internal and external factors.  
One such case is Lebanon, with regard to Palestinian refugees in its territory; 
however, as can be demonstrated by scholars in the area of refugee protection, 
there are many idiosyncrasies and far-reaching issues that can affect the 










Perspectives on Protracted Refugee Crises and Security: A Review of Current 
Literature 
Protracted Refugee Situations 
Two prolific scholars in the field of strategic studies, which deals with the 
issue of PRS, and their implications on security and stability, are Gil Loescher 
and James H. S. Milner.  Together, Loescher and Milner have written Protracted 
Refugee Situations: domestic and international security implications (2005), and 
led workshops on the issue at a conference at St. Antony‘s College at the 
University of Oxford, entitled, ―The Politics, Human Rights and Security 
Implications of Protracted Refugee Situations.‖  The workshops, which were 
hosted by the Alchemy Foundation and the United Nations University, were 
intended to bring together experts and scholars in the field by producing thematic 
papers and case studies to become an edited volume and policy briefing paper to 
impact state policy and intergovernmental organizations on the issue of PRS 
(Betts 2006).  Both Loescher and Milner suggest that the UNHCR‘s definition of 
PRS is flawed.  The UNCHR regards a refugee situation as protracted if it 
involves 25,000 or more refugees who have been exiled for an upwards of five 
years.  Loescher and Milner argue that a standard definition, such as the one set 
out by the UNHCR is detrimental in that it leaves out factors such as ―the small 
residual populations that often remain after repatriation, those outside UNHCR‘s 
mandate, or changes that arise due to repeat migration‖  (Betts 2006, 510).  For 
these reasons, it is far better to open up the definition of PRS to evaluative 
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analysis of each crisis after humanitarian responses have been ongoing, so as to 
not misidentify certain situations as PRS, or to leave out situations which truly are 
PRS, but are not considered as such due to a narrow definition by the UNHCR.  It 
is also important to look at whether a situation is truly a PRS, on criteria focused 
on other factors besides the number of years that the crisis has been going on, and 
the number of refugees it involves, as these can be misleading.  For example, if a 
host country is granting protection to refugees as a result of an ongoing conflict 
which has kept the refugee population in the camp for years on end, then this 
could arguably be considered a PRS.  However, if it is the case, as with 
Palestinian refugees, that the active conflict that brought on the refugee crisis has 
ceased, and in the process the refugees have become stateless, then this could also 
be referred to as a protracted refugee population,
 
as Betts explains  (Betts 2006, 
510).  These differences are important, because they impact the international 
community‘s categorization of the problem, and therefore, the response.  On the 
issue of PRS and security, Loescher and Milner relay that more empirical research 
is needed in order to establish causal relationships between PRS and security in 
order to identify ―opportunities and constraints to use issue-linkage to mobilize 
states to contribute to solutions‖  (Betts 2006, 510).  This point is certainly true, as 
it will be essential to provide research and evidence of the link between the 
absence of human rights and instability in host states, where PRS are occurring, if 
states are to ever change their policies in favor of refugee protection and human 
rights.   
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If more research is needed to make a strong case for the importance of 
PRS and security for host countries, it is necessary to delve into the problem.  
Protracted refugee situations: Political, human rights and security implications, 
edited by Gil Loescher, James Milner, Edward Newman and Gary Troeller, offers 
extensive insight into the problem of PRS itself.  Loeshcer, et al. write that since 
the early 1990s, ―the international community‘s engagement with refugees has 
focused largely on mass influx situations and refugee emergencies, delivering 
humanitarian assistance to refugees and war-affected populations, and 
encouraging large-scale repatriation programmes [sic] in high-profile regions‖  
(Loescher, et al. 2008, 3).  However, the current global refugee situation is that 
two-thirds of refugees are not in emergency situations, but PRS.  Despite the fact 
that there are fewer refugees in the world right now, overall, as compared to years 
prior, there are comparatively higher numbers of PRS (more than thirty, at 
present).  Not surprisingly, these situations are occurring in some of the poorest 
and most unstable countries in the world (Loescher, et al. 2008).  Central to the 
issue, as Loescher et al. point out, is that:  ―Refugees trapped in these situations 
often face significant restrictions on a wide range of rights, while the continuation 
of these chronic refugee problems frequently gives rise to a number of political 
and security concerns for host states and states in the region.  In this way, 
protracted refugee situations represent a significant challenge to both human 
rights and security and, in turn, pose a challenge to refugee and security studies‖ 
(Loescher, et al. 2008,3-4).  This point is critical because it highlights the need for 
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a closer look at PRS because of their implications for host countries, regional 
stability, and human rights.  Even given their potential for exacerbating political 
problems and cross-border tensions in conflict, the issue of PRS has not reached 
the international political agenda, and yet, it should.  The UNHCR has been the 
primary entity dealing with the issue of PRS in camps, by providing services to 
exiled populations and addressing the negative implications of indefinite camp 
life, but that does not constitute a durable solution, argue Loescher, et al.  They 
continue, ―Such a response also fails to address the security implications 
associated with prolonged exile, with the potential consequence of undermining 
stability in the regions where PRS are found and peace-building efforts in the 
countries of origin‖ (Loescher, et al. 2008,4). 
 Loescher, et al. attribute root causes to PRS, citing them as symptoms of 
conflict and persecution.  The push factors of armed conflict, violence, and state 
failure force large groups of the population to flee the country and cross the 
border into the territory of another country to seek refuge.  Such situations are 
inherently difficult to stabilize, and often, ceasefires and peace agreements are 
unsuccessful or break down, making progress slow and casualties frequent.  
Unfortunately, as a consequence of war, the country of origin may fail or topple 
completely, making peace-building even more challenging and the 
implementation of agreements or responses, humanitarian or otherwise, difficult, 
if existent at all.  ―Progress is often incremental,‖ write Loescher, et al., ―in some 
cases spanning decades.  Many peace processes become […] protracted: lengthy 
 27 
and circular negotiations in which concessions are rare, and even if fragile 
agreements have been reached, they have stumbled at the implementation phase‖ 
(Loescher, et al. 2008,4).  They continue, ―Protracted refugee situations are 
therefore indicative of broader challenges regarding civil war and peacebuilding‖ 
(Loescher, et al. 2008,4).  This is the climate in which refugees who face PRS 
live.  Time spent in camps can be indeterminate, and warring countries – the 
country of origin and a second actor, a legitimate government or non-state actor – 
settle their differences, or at least try to go back to the status quo, prior to the 
outbreak of armed conflict.  In the midst of this months-long, years-long, or in 
some cases, decades-long process, refugees who can only seek refuge in camps 
because their second country of asylum will not allow them to locally integrate 
(which eliminates that option for a durable solution), must wait in the camps for 
one of two durable solutions left – this is, to wait for the conflict in their 
homelands to subside, making it safe for them to return voluntarily, or to be 
resettled in a third country at the recommendation of the UNHCR.  If neither of 
these are viable solutions for a particular refugee population, then the 
international community has a Protracted Refugee Situation to contend with.      
 Aside from the inherent volatility of Protracted Refugee Situations, as 
symptoms of war and conflict, PRS are often the result of societal inhibitions that 
become the policy of governments to prevent local integration, therefore 
exacerbating the crisis and the risk of increased violence.  Specifically, states and 
societies often view influxes of refugee populations as sources of instability, even 
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if the majority of the population consists of civilians.  Refugees might be 
perceived as a strain on the economy, especially if the host country‘s economy is 
already struggling, and they may be seen as threats to the national identity and 
social cohesion (Loescher, et al. 2008).  Loescher, et al. refer to this as the 
―pathologies inherent in attitudes towards asylum in policy circles, in both the 
developed and developing worlds‖ (Loescher, et al. 2008,4).  Unfortunately, 
Loescher, et al.‘s assertion would also imply that economic claims are less to 
blame for negative attitudes towards asylum policy than xenophobia, as 
developed and developing countries have both been cited for harsh refugee and 
asylum policies.  Loescher, et al. elaborate on the issue of the inherent pathologies 
as they write:  
―Protracted refugee situations stretch the original assumptions which 
underpinned the international legal regime on refugee protection.  They 
are also indicative of the marginalization of refugee communities in policy 
circles and, above all, the reluctance on the part of governments to 
undertake serious remedial action, especially if that might include local 
integration.  Protracted refugees situations are, therefore, the most acute 
test of refugee and asylum policy, and one that is indicative of broader 
challenges in this field‖ (Loescher, et al. 2008,5).       
The assertion made by Loescher, et al. is a crucial one on the issue of PRS, as it 
demonstrates the multifaceted dimensions of the problem for refugees in those 
situations.  Not only are they essentially living in limbo as political tokens while 
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negotiations are hashed out by their governments, but they are also shunned by 
the society and the state in which they have sought refuge.  This formula puts the 
refugees in a difficult position as they are unable to return home out of fear of 
persecution, and are unable to start their lives through local integration, leaving 
them without a durable solution or future prospects for life outside of the refugee 
camp.   
PRS and Security 
 Despite the humanitarian arguments for addressing PRS, the aspect of 
state sovereignty and security is an enormous issue to contend with in terms of 
garnering international support.  Loescher, et al. write that ―Conventional policy 
analysis and scholarship in the area of national and international security privilege 
the defence [sic] of territory and the state against external military threats.  These 
external military threats are generally embodied in adversarial states.  According 
to this, forced human displacement is a consequence of armed conflict, to be 
approached as an essentially secondary (humanitarian) challenge.  However, there 
is ample evidence that protracted refugee situations are a source – as well as a 
consequence – of instability and conflict‖ (Loescher, et al. 2008,5).  The authors 
assert that PRS are often the driving forces of instability and insurgency, citing 
the conflicts in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as instances in 
which PRS were the ―principal source or catalyst for conflict, rather than a mere 
consequence‖ (Loescher, et al. 2008,5).  The reasons for this are that combatants 
and militants are drawn to these displaced communities because they are easy for 
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them to exploit, especially aimless refugees with grievances, such as the young 
men.  Exiled, disenfranchised, and disempowered, these men are used ―to build 
fighting forces or, on very rare occasions, groups prepared to engage in terrorism‖ 
(Loescher, et al. 2008,5). These stated facts should serve to motivate states to 
engage in policy making on the alleviation of suffering and the existence of PRS.  
In addition, PRS have a potentially adversarial affect on policy outcomes since 
sovereign states in the international community value, albeit rightly, their right to 
protect their nations from armed attacks.  For some countries, particularly those 
involved in ongoing conflicts, refugee populations are seen as threats to national 
security.  So, while this issue makes PRS even more worthy of attention, it has the 
potential of detracting from the humanitarian calls to action because of their 
detrimental impacts on national security.  ―On other occasions,‖ they write, 
―conspicuous refugee communities – especially when concentrated in border 
regions – can upset local balances and generate local antagonism‖ (Loescher, et 
al. 2008,5).  Loescher, et al. summarize the dichotomy between humanitarian and 
security claims and their interconnectedness by writing that, human rights should 
remain the ―overriding rationale for generating durable solutions‖ to PRS.  
Furthermore, ―The security challenges of protracted refugee situations must not 
form a pretext for even greater cantonment and warehousing of refugees.  
Nevertheless, the security implications of leaving PRS unresolved suggest that 
greater efforts are essential‖ (Loescher, et al. 2008,5).     
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 Another comprehensive source of research on the topic of security and 
rights in Protracted Refugee Situations comes from a special edition of the World 
Refugee Survey, 2004, entitled, ―Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a 
Waste of Humanity.‖  As the editor of the report, Merrill Smith, noted, one of the 
biggest problems in addressing PRS through international interventions is that the 
Refugee Convention does not even reference the term ―camp,‖ and therefore, does 
not address camp security and stipulations on how far a camp should be from the 
border of a conflict zone.  The rights of refugees in camps can only be determined 
by implicit articles of the Refugee Convention.  For example, even though the UN 
has made five-years of encampment a benchmark for becoming a PRS, there are 
various standards.  Although the standards are variant, the Refugee Convention, 
Article 17 (2) (a) mandates states to grant refugees in their territories the same 
rights of employment as nationals, when refugees have spent an upwards of three 
years in the country of first asylum.  Furthermore, Article 7 (2) dictates a three-
year limit on legislative reciprocity restrictions.  Aside from these two articles, 
there are no delays in the exercise of rights for refugees in countries of first 
asylum, which means that signatories of the Refugee Convention do have positive 
duties when it comes to refugees living in their territories for protracted periods 
(USCRI 2004, 38).  However, as the Survey notes, ―the key feature of 
warehousing is not so much the passage of time as the denial of rights‖ (USCRI 
2004, 38).  Certainly, it is true that these situations occur in some of the most 
volatile places in the world, which is what contributed to the refugee crisis in the 
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first place.  The report says that PRS occur ―in the most desolate and dangerous 
settings in harsh peripheral, insecure border areas, typically for political and 
military, rather than humanitarian, reasons.‖  It continues, quoting a UNHCR 
officer speaking to the issue of PRS in camps near Goma, (then-Zaire), when the 
officer said: ―there is no doubt that refugees are better off living outside camps‖ 
(USCRI 2004, 38).  There are many reasons why the UNHCR officer‘s statement 
is true.  Refugees in camps are deprived of their rights to move freely, to work, 
and to live satisfying lives with all of the freedoms afforded to nationals in their 
countries of first asylum.  Worst of all, refugees living in PRS are subject to 
potential violence and violations of their rights, which is ironic given that they 
have fled from a well-founded fear of persecution, only to find the same 
detrimental circumstances in what should be their places of refuge.   
 There are various examples of refugees becoming subject to violence in 
refugee camps, where their rights and protection should have been guaranteed.  
The Kakuma camp in Kenya ―is notably worse than in southern Sudan where 
most of the refugees originate,‖ asserted the Survey (USCRI 2004, 39).  Camp life 
there consists of idleness and forced over-dependence of refugees on service 
providers.  These conditions have obscured traditional gender roles in which 
men‘s sense of livelihood and responsibility as providers has been degraded, 
whereas women have retained their roles, and even gained increased importance 
from some refugee agencies (USCRI 2004, 39).  The UNHCR‘s Agenda for 
Protection continued that ―serious protection problems, including gender-based 
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violence…can result from over dependency and idleness‖ (USCRI 2004, 39).  
Female Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kenya camps reported that men who had 
been chewing psychoactive khat leaves out of boredom and frustration after long 
periods of confinement and inactivity, became violent against women.  Further, in 
Uganda, Sudanese women reported being raped by fellow refugees, locals, rebels, 
and Ugandan soldiers.  As a result of PRS, among other things, women and girls 
in these camps become subject to ―sexual concubinage, including sexual abuse by 
aid agency employees that has come to be known as ‗assistance-related sexual 
exploitation‘‖ (USCRI 2004, 39).   
 Another crucial issue of PRS is that the conditions for refugees breed 
disempowerment and a perceived lack of efficacy, which is likely to result in 
conflict or political violence.  According to the Survey, ―warehousing refugees 
aggravates their near total disempowerment.  Many warehoused refugees become 
spectators to their own lives rather than active participants in decision-making.   
Authoritarian military conditions, camp confinement, and almost complete 
reliance on international assistance can generate pathological dependency, low 
self-esteem, and lack of initiative‖ (USCRI 2004, 42).  Such conditions are 
catalysts for violence, particularly political or ideological violence in refugee 
camps.  It is not infrequently the case that refugees who have been disempowered 
and forced to flee from their homelands, become politically embittered in the 
camps.  Furthermore, conditions in the camps, as difficult as they are, may even 
lead once apolitical individuals to become active in their political views.  Militias 
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also have a role in camp violence in taking advantage of disempowered 
individuals by mobilizing them to achieve their political ends.  Ragnhild Ek and 
Ahmed Karadawi make this same linkage between refugees and instability in their 
article, entitled, ―Implications of Refugee Flows on Political Stability in the 
Sudan,‖ from the Refugee Survey Quarterly.  Ek and Karadawi attribute violence 
in refugee camps to the development of political awareness of refugees in the 
camps, which moves individuals to engage in political activities, and sometimes 
violence.  The authors point to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), citing 
the organization‘s designation of normative standards for the treatment of 
refugees to depoliticize their presence in a particular area.  For instance, the 
OAS‘s Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
Article 3, entitled ―Prohibition of Subversive Activities,‖ recognizes that: 
―1. Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, 
which require in particular that he conforms with its laws and regulations 
as well as with measures taken for the maintenance of public order.  He 
shall also abstain from any subversive activities against any Member State 
of the OAU. 
2.  Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their 
respective territories from attacking any State Member of the OAU, by 
any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in 
particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio‖  (Organization of 
African Unity 1969, Art. 3). 
 35 
The authors argue that normative standards such as these are based on the 
assumption that refugees in exile ―often appear to develop their political 
awareness and engage in activities which aim to influence the situation in their 
countries of origin‖ (Ek and Karadawi 1991, 196).  Although, the OAU‘s stance 
seems to imply that refugee politicization is a source of conflict, as it very well 
could be, it neglects to address the possibility of insurgency in refugee camps with 
armed groups or political factions making their way into camps to use them as 
bases for their activities.  The sole focus on the radicalization of the refugees 
themselves, one might argue, is what exacerbates PRS.  The reason one might 
argue this is because it is this fear of the politicization and militarization of the 
refugee population in the camps that incites states to isolate them to begin with.  
Unfortunately, this security-focused strategy, which infringes upon human rights, 
is inflammatory in that the isolation and captivity of refugees in camps could 
actually mobilize individuals who might otherwise have remained apolitical.  Ek 
and Karadawi continue, ―[Refugees] are either actively involved in the conflict 
that caused their exodus, or act as a broad constituency for political groupings 
challenging the territorial shape or the power structure of the state of origin.  
Hence, the conflict spills over to the host country as it is turned into a base for 
political activities, with or without the support of the host government, and as 
fighting continues either among the original contending parties or as factionalism 
among the opposition groups‖ (Ek and Karadawi 1991, 196).  Yet, it is important 
not to generalize, because, although it is certainly true that refugees, 
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disempowered by conflict and subsequent warehousing in the camp may become 
moved to political violence, it is also the case that political groups and ideologues 
will infiltrate a camp to target the host country and use the refugee population as a 
base to recruit young, powerless and disgruntled individuals to achieve their 
political ends.  The relationship between refugee camps as sources of conflict and 
catalysts of conflict is an interesting dynamic that is deserving of more inquiry. 
 The World Refugee Survey attempts to delve deeper into the relationship 
between refugee camp conditions in PRS and that of security.  States, particularly 
in times of war or conflict, frequently make claims to security as a basis of their 
refugee or immigration policies.  The Survey states, ―Foreign nationals living at-
large in disputed border areas may indeed pose risks, but camps can become 
hotbeds of political agitation as well‖ (USCRI 2004, 45).  As Barbara Harrell-
Bond states, ―It is very nearly impossible to maintain the civilian character of a 
camp‖ (Harrell-Bond 2002, 19).  Yet, this is one of the central principles of 
international humanitarian law.  In the 1969 Kassem case, Israel‘s Military Court 
at Ramallah recognized the immunity of civilians from direct attacks as a 
fundamental principle of international humanitarian law (Henckaerts and 
Doswald-Beck 2005, 65).  Another example is the ICRC‘s appeal to the Patriotic 
Front in 1979 during the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict to ―clearly separate civilian 
establishments, particularly refugee camps, from military installations‖ 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, 134).  Again, in October 1973, the ICRC 
appealed to Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Syria, prior to the adoption of Additional 
 37 
Protocol I of the Hague Regulations, to recognize the distinction between 
combatants and civilians, to which the involved states responded accordingly.  
Under a Statute of the International Criminal Court, it was ruled that 
―intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities‖ is a war crime (Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck 2005, 65).  Furthermore, asserts the ICRC, ―Numerous 
military manuals, including those of States not, or not at the time, party to 
Additional Protocol I, stipulate that a distinction must be made between civilians 
and combatants and that it is prohibited to direct attacks against civilians‖ 
(Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, 65).  These are only a few examples of 
norms that have been practiced with regard to civilian protection, and these make 
certain rules customary in international law.  This Principle of Distinction, as it is 
called, constitutes rule number one in the ICRC‘s volume on customary 
international humanitarian law: ―The parties to the conflict must at all times 
distinguish between civilians and combatants.  Attacks may only be directed 
against combatants.  Attacks must not be directed against civilians‖ (Henckaerts 
and Doswald-Beck 2005, 64).  The ICRC continues, ―State practice establishes 
this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international 
and non-international armed conflict‖ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, 64).  
With regard to refugees, who are not combatants, their protection in refugee 
camps, which is of a civilian and humanitarian character, is a cornerstone of 
international humanitarian law.   
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 As a key feature of international humanitarian law, the protection of 
refugees in camps, is an essential obligation of host countries, and cannot be 
secondary to security concerns.  In particular, the World Refugee Survey, and 
others, provide substantial information as to why calls for increased security not 
only fail, but increase tensions for refugees in camps in PRS.  It has been reported 
that some governments target refugee camps for cross-border incursions and hold 
the host countries accountable for these attacks.  ―Ironically,‖ writes the Survey, 
―if border tensions militate for any restriction on the movement of unarmed 
refugees, it would make more sense to let them live freely anywhere but in the 
border area‖ (USCRI 2004, 45).  Between 1994 and 1996, Rwandan refugee 
camps located in Tanzania and then-Zaire, were notorious for being safe-havens 
for ―genocide perpetrators who diverted aid to military and paramilitary personnel 
and intimidated residents‖ (USCRI 2004, 45).  In the case of Sudanese refugees in 
Kakuma, Kenya, the Sudan People‘s Liberation Army (SPLA) utilized the camps 
for military ends (USCRI 2004, 45).  According to Jeff Crisp in ―A state of 
insecurity: the political economy of violence in refugee-populated areas of 
Kenya,‖ ―The SPLA plays an important role in the selection of community 
leaders and hence the administration of the camp.  Kakuma provides recruits (and 
possibly conscripts) for the rebel forces.  It acts as a safe refuge for the wives and 
children of men who are fighting in southern Sudan.  It is visited on a regular 
basis by SPLA commanders‖ (Crisp 1999, 5; 23).  It was reported that SPLA 
fighters actually used Ugandan refugee reception centers to rest and recreate, and 
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to forcibly recruit refugee men and boys, because of Uganda‘s perceived (and 
likely, factual) support of SPLA and their war against the Sudanese government 
(USCRI 2004, 45-46).  According to Global Security, an organization focused on 
innovative approaches to the emerging security challenges of the new millennium, 
some have linked the Sudanese government to support of the rebel group, Lord‘s 
Resistance Army (LRA), which has been fighting the Ugandan government since 
1986  (Global Security 2004).  This linkage has been made as a result of Uganda‘s 
alleged support of the SPLA.  Relations between Sudan and Uganda began to 
improve, beginning in 1999 when both countries signed an agreement to stop 
covertly supporting the LRA and the SPLA, respectively.  Then, in February 
2003, Sudan allowed Ugandan troops to enter its territory to wage attacks on the 
LRA (Global Security 2010).  In effect, what these examples illustrate is that, 
Uganda, and others like it, permit the politicization of refugee camps to achieve 
its own political ends, while simultaneously undermining the fulfillment of its 
obligation to provide international protection.  These are precisely the 
circumstances that lead to violence in camps and the debasement of rights to 
which refugees are entitled.   
 As has been illustrated, restrictive policies towards refugees living in 
camps are not only destructive in terms of a state‘s national security, but are also 
detrimental to human rights and can even aggravate problems that are already 
present, prior to state involvement or covert political or military strategic 
involvement.  ―Not only do camps often not solve security problems,‖ reports the 
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World Refugee Survey, ―they can aggravate existing problems and create new 
ones‖ (USCRI 2004, 46).  Karen Jacobsen writes in ―The forgotten solution: local 
integration for refugees in developing countries,‖ a UNHCR Working Paper that 
―In addition to the military problem like raids or direct attacks experienced by 
camps, their culture and organization make for a climate of violence and 
intimidation.  …The presence of weapons increases the combustibility of the 
situation in and around the camps, as does the problem of bored and frustrated 
young men.  These are ingredients for crime and violence, the rise of political and 
ethnic factions, and the increased likelihood of recruitment into militias or 
organized crime‖ (Jacobsen 2001, 13).  Jacobsen‘s analysis is comprehensive of 
the multitudinous issues that make refugee camps volatile.  The very nature of 
camps, or the culture, as Jacobsen calls it, is centered upon and created around 
conflict.  Refugee camps are tangible products of war and conflict in the same 
way that killed and injured civilians are, in that they are all the collateral damage 
caused by war.  Whereas an injured or killed civilian has a diagnosis and a 
prognosis, there is no definite end or solution for refugees living in PRS.  As a 
result, refugees find ways to mobilize themselves, or if they do not, outside state 
or non-state actors find ways to use the camp as a platform for political and 
military gain.   
 For these reasons, many scholars and practitioners agree that dismantling 
camps can enhance the rights and security of refugees (USCRI 2004, 46).  
Refugee camps that are host to PRS breed immobility, dependency and 
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disempowerment.  These factors, combined with a lack of legitimacy of camp 
administration, either by international organizations or a foreign government to 
the refugees living in them, leads to upheaval and ultimately danger for those that 
need protection the most.  Richard Black, in ―Putting refugees in camps,‖ asserts 
that ―the difference is striking between frequent noncompliance with agency 
generated rules, which are seen by refugees as lacking legitimacy, and general 
noncompliance with rules established by local custom, tradition, or edict‖  (Black 
1998, 7).  ―Thus,‖ offers the World Refugee Survey report, ―it may be more 
effective to strengthen local law enforcement capacity than to impose a foreign, 
military-style camp regime, but instead of using such aid as an incentive to 
nonwarehousing alternatives, donors have directed assistance to increased police 
enforcement of the camps themselves‖ (USCRI 2004, 46).  This is a viable 
argument in which to move forward with the issue of PRS because it emphasizes 
security and protection within the camp to ensure that host countries meet their 
obligations to protect within the camp.  Although it seems that it only addresses a 
symptom of a much larger problem, which is the issue of warehousing refugees to 
begin with, as opposed to locally integrating them into the host country, or the 
issue of the politicization of refugee situations by host countries.  Aside from the 
utter elimination of war and conflict that cause refugee crises (which is ideal, 
although highly unlikely), the best option for refugees as determined through 
international law, is that of a durable solution.  Tom Kuhlman, author of 
―Responding to protracted refugee situations: A case study of Liberian refugees in 
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Cote d‘Ivoire,‖ and ―Burden or boon: A Study of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan,‖ 
says it best when he asserts that a paradigm shift is crucial to alleviating PRS and 
the warehousing of refugees which is that host countries should prepare for PRS 
rather than short-lived crises.  Kuhlman writes, ―[I]t is better to plan for a 
protracted refugee situation than for a short-lived crisis.  Only if during the first 
year it already appears abundantly evident that the refugees will soon be able to 
return home can programmes [sic] aimed at local integration be abandoned.  In 
most cases they will not yet have begun implementation during that time‖ 
(USCRI 2004, 47).  That is to say, that to adequately provide protection to 
refugees, it is advised to act in ways that would assume that the refugee crisis will 
be long-term so as to work towards durable solutions of local integration or 
resettlement in a third country.  A host state cannot cease to work towards durable 
solutions until it is quite obvious that the conflict in the refugees‘ country of 
origin is safe enough for them to voluntarily repatriate, which is also a durable 
solution.   
 In the case of Palestinian refugees around the Middle East, which is ―the 
largest and longest-warehoused refugee population in the world,‖ it is a perfect 
example of why Kuhlman‘s proposed paradigm shift is essential (USCRI 2004, 
47).  Most thought that the Palestinian refugee crisis would not last long, yet, 
more than sixty years and $16.5 billion spent by UNRWA later, (USCRI 2004, 
47) the crisis continues, and arguably grows worse each year, as the population 
expands and the economic and health conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps 
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continue to be subpar in terms of the quality of life.  It is for these reasons that, as 
Kuhlman would suggest, it is necessary to address the Palestinian refugee crisis as 
a long-term crisis in need of durable solutions to put an end to the crisis, rather 
than a temporary crisis that will solve itself with the passage of time.      
Human Security              
An emerging field that argues for the protection of individuals, known as 
―human security‖ is an important paradigm that can be utilized to make an 
argument for the protection of refugees, regardless of which country one finds 
himself after fleeing armed conflict.  Human security has been broadly defined as 
providing security for people, rather than just states, which includes basic 
freedoms and basic human needs.  Human security also challenges the primacy of 
state sovereignty as a legitimate entity if it cannot provide security to its citizens.  
There are many approaches to human security, but the most applicable to refugee 
issues is a more narrow approach which ―considers the ‗human consequences of 
armed conflict and dangers posed to civilians by repressive governments and 
situations of state failure.‘‖  The concept of human security is derived from the 
notion that post-Cold War conflict is no longer between states, but rather, can 
emanate from political factions, competing ethnic groups, or ideologues.  After 
the Cold War, traditional security concerns were replaced by a new dimension on 
the academic study of war that focused on ―new security challenges associated 
with the decline of centralized state institutions and the dissolution of federal 
states.  In response, the focus of Strategic Studies broadened to include internal as 
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well as international armed conflict‖ (Lambert and Farrell 2010).  This marked 
shift is important to refugee law, as it recognizes the increased occurrences of 
cross-border conflict, and the resulting refugee crises that are the result.  
Consequently, it is not surprising that refugee camps have the potential of 
becoming safe-havens for violent groups.     
The “State of Exception”  
 Several scholars have written very interesting pieces on the physical space 
of the refugee camp itself and the juxtaposition between its role as a safe-haven 
and place of refuge, and its simultaneous power to exercise mastery over the 
population that inhabits it.  Many have called the refugee camps places of 
lawlessness, lacking in rights, encircling the communities that live there.  To 
illustrate these points, a number of scholars have applied Giorgio Agamben‘s 
conception of the camp as being in a ―state of exception‖ to their work.  
Agamben‘s ―state of exception‖ refers to a state of lawlessness in which calls for 
security and states of emergency justify the use of unadulterated control of the 
masses, in this case, the refugees in the camp, regardless of law and order.  In this 
regard, the refugee camp is a politicized space, argues Romola Sanyal, in a piece 
from the Urban Studies Journal entitled, ―Squatting in Camps: Building and 
Insurgency in Space of Refuge.‖  Sanyal references Richard Black who asserts 
that host nations frequently put refugees into camps, not for the purposes of 
ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and services, but to avoid cross-border 
conflict, and the ―use of their territory by militant groups linked to refugees for 
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attacks on neighboring states‖ (Sanyal 2010, 3).  NGOs have reported the use of 
refugee camps as training grounds for militias and cross-border attacks on states 
that are perceived as being the culprits of their displacement.  Thus, there is a 
dichotomy between the refugee camp as a humanitarian space or refuge; 
protecting the voiceless, the marginalized, the exiled, while simultaneously 
serving as a voice in and of itself for the exiled to exert their political existence 
and assert their identity, nationalistically, ethnically, politically or otherwise.   
 Others have referenced similar notions of the ―state of exception,‖ that 
highlight the lack of rule of law within the camps as a reflection of poor, or the 
absence of, governance.  Although, Lebanon is regarded as a sovereign nation, 
scholars such as Sari Hanafi and Taylor Long view the refugee camps in Lebanon 
as ―exceptional,‖ or existing in a state of exception.  Hanafi and Taylor explain: 
―In spite of Lebanese claims to the contrary, Lebanese law, for all practical 
purposes, in that it is only rarely and arbitrarily enforced, has been suspended 
within the confines of the camp.  In this sense, the camps have become ‗spaces of 
exception‘‖ (Hanafi and Long 2010, 147).  Turning to Agamben, they insert: 
refugees in Lebanese camps live in a ―‗zone of indistinction between outside and 
inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective 
right and juridical protection no longer make any sense‘‖ (Hanafi and Long 2010, 
147).  As Hanafi and Long rightly point out, Agamben‘s state of exception 
primarily refers to the suspension of law by a sovereign state, typically in the 
name of national security or defense.  In the context of Agamben‘s work, refugees 
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are then a voiceless collective living in a state of ―bare life.‖  Bare life can best be 
described in terms of ―homo sacer,‖ a man who, in Roman law, has been banned 
and stripped of all rights, and can be killed by anyone, but not sacrificed to the 
gods.  Homo sacer has no significance to the sovereign powers, politically or 
otherwise, and thus, he exists only biologically, or lives in ―bare life.‖  Hanafi and 
Long apply Agamben to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, stating:  ―The 
Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, for example, lives on the margins of the law and 
therefore has no say in its drafting or application.  The Palestinian has no voice in 
the legal formulation of his or her status and no say in either the Lebanese or 
Palestinian political processes which affect him or her.  The Lebanese state has 
refused to take responsibility for the refugees and has relegated the management 
of their lives to UNRWA, which has the mandate only to provide them with bare 
life‖ (Hanafi and Long 2010, 148).  Given the lack of rights afforded to 
Palestinian refugees, or any refugees for that matter, in Lebanon, it is easy to see 
why many scholars have utilized Agamben‘s work on the state of exception to 
draw out commonalities between bare life, as he calls it, and the camp life for 
refugees in Lebanon, particularly Palestinian refugees.   
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are, in effect, limited to ―bare life,‖ as 
scholars of Agamben have called it.  Palestinians are given few economic rights, 
live in poverty with a large portion being considered hardship cases by UNRWA 
(United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East), and have limited movement, limited access to education and health care, 
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and of course, lack many rights and freedoms that Lebanese citizens enjoy from 
the sovereign power.  From this perspective, and others, nationalist movements, 
as well as political and religious movements coming from within the camp can be 
seen as attempts by Palestinians to exert political influence, to establish an 
identity, and to illustrate a level of agency over their own well-being before the 


















The Palestinian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: the Absence of Human Rights and 
Stability 
The primary example of the connection between the absence of human 
rights and instability, which will be used as the focus of this paper, is the 
Palestinian refugee crisis in Lebanon.  The Palestinian refugees are somewhat of a 
unique case – a group of people who have been in legal and political limbo for 
decades, with no imminent remedy in place.  Taking a simple glance at the 
literature on Palestinian refugees reveals the frustration; the issue has been 
referred to as the ―Palestinian problem‖ countless times.  Despite the expansive 
legal protections intended by the effect of the Refugee Convention and the 
subsequent expansions of the 1967 Convention, neither convention addresses the 
enigma that has become of the decades-long Palestinian refugee crisis.  Given the 
protracted refugee crisis of the Palestinians and the circumstances surrounding the 
population‘s exile, there are distinctive protections and limitations that apply to 
the Palestinians that impact a host country‘s duties and obligations to the refugee 
population. 
Protection of Refugees through UNRWA 
 Central to the international community‘s and Lebanon‘s relationship to 
Palestinian refugees is, once again, the Refugee Convention.  However, the 
Refugee Convention is not important to the status of Palestinian refugees on the 
basis of what it protects, but rather, on the basis of what it does not protect.  
Although reading the Refugee Convention may lead one to believe that it is an 
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overarching, all-encompassing, cornerstone document of refugee protection, and 
some may argue that it is, it is astounding that it is essentially a document of 
exclusion, rather than protection, when it comes to Palestinian refugees.  The 
reason for that exclusion emanates from a UN mandate which created the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA / اورنولأا).  UNRWA was established after the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict 
by United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) on December 8, 1949 to 
give direct assistance and deliver programs to Palestinian refugees.  The agency 
began its work on May 1, 1950, but remains in operation today because of the 
circumstances surrounding the continued Arab-Israeli conflict.  ―In the absence of 
a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem,‖ the Agency writes on its website, 
―the General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA‘s mandate, most 
recently extending it until June 30, 2011‖ (UNRWA 2010).  Today, UNRWA 
―provides assistance, protection and advocacy for some 4.7 million registered 
Palestinian refugees in the Middle East.  The Agency‘s services encompass 
education, health care, relief, camp infrastructure and improvement, community 
support, microfinance and emergency response, including in times of armed 
conflict‖  (UNRWA 2010b)  Since May 1950, when the Agency began its work, 
the UN has renewed UNRWA‘s mandate consistently, as a result of the continued 
refugee crisis among Palestinians.  UNRWA‘s current mandate remains in effect 
until June 30
th
, 2011.  The Agency has field offices in Jordan, Lebanon, Gaza, the 
West Bank, and Syria, and works in fifty-eight recognized refugee camps in 
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which 1.4 million Palestinian refugees, or one-third of the total, live.  According 
to UNRWA, they provide ―assistance, protection and advocacy for some 4.7 
million registered Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the occupied 
Palestinian territory, pending a solution to their plight.‖  The Agency continues, 
―UNRWA is the main provider of basic services – education, health, relief and 
social services – to … registered Palestine refugees in the Middle East‖  
(UNRWA 2010a).  While it may seem as though Palestinian refugees were the 
recipients of a great service by the international community, as UNRWA is 
funded ―almost entirely by voluntary contributions from UN member states,‖ it 
actually serves as the basis for exclusionary measures written into the Refugee 
Convention (UNRWA 2010a).   
According to the UNHCR‘s ―Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian refugees,‖ 
the Refugee Convention explicitly bars Palestinian refugees from the same 
guarantees which the UNHCR admittedly dubbed, the ―exclusion clause‖  
(UNHCR 2002).  The Note says:  
―The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter ‗the 
1951 Convention‘) contains certain provisions whereby persons otherwise 
having the characteristics of refugees, as defined in Article 1A, are 
excluded from the benefits of this Convention. One such provision, 
paragraph 1 of Article 1D, applies to a special category of refugees for 
whom separate arrangements have been made to receive protection or 
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assistance from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In today‘s 
context, this excludes from the benefits of the 1951 Convention those 
Palestinians who are refugees as a result of the 1948 or 1967 Arab-Israeli 
conflicts, and who are receiving protection or assistance from the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA)‖  (UNHCR 2002). 
As the Note makes very clear, the creation of UNRWA excluded Palestinian 
refugees from the protection afforded to non-Palestinian refugees around the 
world.  Amnesty International writes: ―When states drafted the statute of the 
UNHCR and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention), they included provisions that excluded Palestinian refugees who 
were receiving assistance from UNRWA.  As UNRWA is primarily a relief 
agency, Palestinian refugees receiving assistance from UNRWA became the only 
refugee population in the world excluded from the international protection 
accorded by the UNHCR Statute and the Refugee Convention‖  (Amnesty 
International 2007, 7).  When UNRWA was established to provide for Palestinian 
refugees as special cases, they were not included in the protection of the Refugee 
Convention, because, as Kuhlman would assert, the UNHCR, possibly under the 
pressure of involved states, ultimately decided to treat the Palestinian refugee 
crisis as a short-lived crisis rather than a protracted refugee situation, which has, 
decades later, proven to be a drastic mistake. 
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The exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the Refugee Convention has a 
widespread impact on Lebanon and its relationship with UNRWA.  Lebanon, 
which is the key example that will be used in this paper, is a comprehensive case 
for looking at PRS and the issues inhibiting refugee protection to international 
humanitarian standards, which has had tangible consequences on peace and 
security in Lebanon.  Lebanon is a host to refugees in the Middle East, although 
begrudgingly, and is a non-contracting state to the Refugee Convention – not that 
it would matter with regard to Palestinians since the Refugee Convention does not 
apply to them – however, not being a signatory to the Refugee Convention does 
not relieve countries of their obligations according to customary international 
humanitarian law.  As discussed earlier, countries are not only obligated not to 
return, or refoule, refugees to their habitual place of residence where they face 
persecution, but are obligated to provide humane standards of treatment to all 
civilians in a conflict.  According to customary international humanitarian law, 
such standards should include shelter, hygiene, health, safety, nutrition, and the 
right to keep family units together at all costs (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 
2005, 463).  Unfortunately, these humane standards have not been guaranteed to 
refugees in Lebanon because the Lebanese government has left the entire burden 
on UNRWA.  The problem with such an approach is that there are rights to which 
Palestinian refugees are entitled that UNRWA simply cannot provide, such as 
security or a durable solution.   
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 Lebanon is a fascinating case in looking at the rights, protection and 
security of refugees, because for a country with such stringent restrictions on the 
rights of refugees, Lebanon is actually host to twelve ―official‖ Palestinian 
refugee camps and dozens of informal gatherings or ―unofficial camps‖ 
throughout Lebanon  (Amnesty International 2007, 7).  There are an estimated 
425,640 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, of which, approximately 12 
percent are categorized as special hardship cases (SHCs) by UNRWA (UNRWA, 
In Figures 2010).  It is important to note here the emphasis on registered refugees.  
This is because there are three categories of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon – 
those who are registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese government 
(registered), those registered only with the Lebanese government (non-registered), 
and those registered with neither UNRWA or the Lebanese government (referred 
to as non-ID refugees) who do not have proper identification documents to 
validate their legal status and protection – all of which impacts the rights and 
treatment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon  (Amnesty International 2007, 7).  
The last official census in Lebanon was in 1932, so numbers are a bit varied, 
however, there is an additional estimated 35,000 non-registered refugees in 
Lebanon, and between 3,000 and 5,000 non-ID refugees (Amnesty International 
2007, 7).   
Nearly 10 percent of Lebanon‘s population consists of refugees, about 53 
percent of which are living in ―war-torn, decaying and poverty-stricken camps,‖ 
according to a report by Amnesty International (AI), entitled, ―Lebanon: Exiled 
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and suffering: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon‖  (Amnesty International 2007).  
Many of the refugees there were displaced as a result, directly or indirectly, of the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel.  Between the 
end of 1947 and mid 1949, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled the territory 
that is now Israel.  By the following year, approximately 914,000 Palestinians 
registered as refugees.  It has been estimated that an additional 400,000 
Palestinians were displaced during the conflict in 1967.  In short, it has been over 
sixty years, and yet the Palestinian population is stateless with approximately half 
living as refugees in other countries, with large numbers in Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon, and half that are internally displaced in the occupied territories of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip in Israel.  For the purpose of this discussion, the 
focus will remain solely on Palestinian refugees, meaning, Palestinians that have 
fled Israel to seek refuge.  In particular, the analysis will be with regard to 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  Even given the sheer number of refugees 
present in Lebanon and the veracity of the issue, Palestinian refugees in the 
country are not afforded the same basic human rights given to citizens of 
Lebanon.  Throughout the refugee camps in Lebanon, Palestinians are 
consistently denied the social and economic rights that customary international 
humanitarian law promises them (Amnesty International 2007).    
Even though UNRWA is mandated to provide basic services to Palestinian 
refugees, such as education, health, relief and social services,  (UNRWA 2010a) 
that does not free Lebanon of any burden as a second country of asylum for 
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Palestinian refugees.  The International Crisis Group makes a valid point when it 
asserts that, ―In Lebanon, UNRWA is the single most important provider of camp 
services and largest employer of Palestinian refugees; in effect, it is a substitute 
for the absent Lebanese state‖  (International Crisis Group 2009, 23).  For 
instance, in many of the unofficial camps in Lebanon, or gatherings, UNRWA 
cannot reach those populations, and while those individuals are allowed to receive 
services from UNRWA, which serves refugees who are registered or non-
registered, whether living in official or unofficial camps or gatherings (Amnesty 
International 2007, 7).  While those living outside of the camps are eligible for 
services, UNRWA is usually logistically unable to provide common services, 
such as waste disposal, for example, which falls on the local authorities‘ 
responsibility (Amnesty International 2007, 7-8).   
UNRWA‘s mandate does not cover every aspect of life for Palestinians, 
and in fact, it has many shortcomings, which is why Lebanon must ensure rights 
and services to Palestinians where UNRWA is not mandated to do so.  According 
to UNRWA, its mandate is as follows: 1) to ―carry out direct relief and works 
programmes [sic] in collaboration with local governments‖; 2) to ―consult with 
the Near Eastern governments concerning measures to be taken preparatory to the 
time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer 
available‖; 3) and, to ―plan for the time when relief was no longer needed‖ 
(UNRWA 2010c).  This mandate comes back to the main point of refugee 
protection, which is protection and durable solutions.  Services are to be carried 
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out in collaboration with the local governments, but when operating in a country 
such as Lebanon, which does little to ensure the basic rights of Palestinians, it 
poses a challenge for UNRWA there, not only operationally, but with regard to 
security.   
Lebanon’s Obligations to Palestinian Refugees According to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
While Palestinian refugees are not covered by the Refugee Convention, 
nor is Lebanon a signatory, Lebanon is still obligated to ensure services and rights 
to refugees under UNRWA‘s mandate, because Lebanon is the host country, and 
it is obligated to collaborate with UNRWA under the UN mandate.  The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
which was ratified in December 1966 and entered into force in January 1976 in 
such obligation for Lebanon.   Lebanon acceded (consented to become legally 
bound to the terms of the treaty) to the ICESCR on November 3, 1972, which is a 
United Nations treaty that aims to assure certain economic, social and cultural 
rights for all individuals, not just refugees, living in the territory of a party to the 
treaty  (United Nations Treaty Collection 1966).  It took nearly ten years for the 
ICESCR to be entered into force, illustrating the challenges associated with 
garnering state support for the egalitarian application of economic, social and 
cultural rights for those in their territories due to financial or institutional 
challenges, or sometimes, outright discriminatory sentiment. It is important to 
note that, even though Lebanon has argued that Palestinians‘ access to rights has 
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been restricted on the basis of preserving the right to return, that does not 
constitute a legitimate justification for the denial of rights.  ―Furthermore,‖ writes 
Amnesty International, ―states should not interpret the distinction between 
nationals and non-nationals to undermine their obligations under international 
human rights law‖ (Amnesty International 2007, 9).  Although examples of 
subpar standards abound, this thesis focuses on areas in which Lebanon has not 
met its legally binding obligations to provide economic, social and cultural rights 
to Palestinian refugees in the Nahr al-Bared camp, which is used later as an 
illustration of how the denial of rights and security can lead to increased 
instability and deprivation of liberty and life.              
 Despite natural population growth since the inception of UNRWA camps, 
the Lebanese territory allocated to the camps has not grown with the population, 
which has led to severe overcrowding and substandard housing conditions.  
Amnesty International reported from the field that ―Some households…had 
families of 10 sharing a single room. Lack of space within the camps‘ boundaries 
restricts horizontal expansion and consequently the only alternative, particularly 
in the most densely-populated camps of Shatila, Burj el-Barajneh, Ein al-Hilweh 
and, until it was virtually destroyed in 2007, Nahr al-Bared, is to build upwards‖  
(Amnesty International 2007, 9).  In Nahr al-Bared, it was reported that three 
families, made up of eleven people, were living in a single structure prior to the 
destruction of the camp in 2007.  One of the structure‘s inhabitants told Amnesty 
International in an interview that one of the babies in the family died during the 
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summer, presumably from heat stroke, as the baby was left in a room with no 
ventilation that was made entirely out of zinc sheeting (Amnesty International 
2007, 11).      
 Another issue in Palestinian camps in Lebanon is a lack of suitable 
healthcare.  One Palestinian woman who was registered with UNRWA told 
Amnesty International just how bad the healthcare situation in Lebanon is for 
Palestinians.  She said: ―We cannot get proper healthcare because we are 
Palestinians. If your child is sick, he will just die‖ (Amnesty International 2007, 
17).  Medical treatment is costly in Lebanon, and in most of the accounts given by 
registered Palestinian refugees, UNRWA can only partially cover the costs, and 
can typically cover nothing for the others.  Furthermore, secondary healthcare is 
usually not subsidized, and there is a shortage of health care professionals, 
facilities or equipment to meet the needs of the population (Amnesty International 
2007, 18).  Ahmed Moussa, a refugee from Nahr al-Bared camp told Amnesty 
International of his troubles with regard to the health system.  Moussa reported:  
―My wife‘s father got gangrene in his leg. UNRWA paid for the hospital bed but 
the family had to find money for medicines -- around LL 1 million. We got some 
help from NGOs but couldn‘t find it all, and his condition worsened.‖  The 
Lebanese government has openly called the Palestinian refugees‘ living situation 
―unbearable,‖ and yet, has not worked to alleviate the suffering caused by the 
healthcare system‘s shortcomings in Palestinian camps, therefore, failing to 
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ensure ―a right enshrined in treaties that the Lebanese authorities have committed 
to uphold…‖  (Amnesty International 2007, 18).  
 Additionally, the labor market in Lebanon is discriminatory towards 
Palestinian refugees.  In Lebanon, many Palestinian refugees relay the same 
grievance that they have been systematically ―barred from jobs, either by law or 
prejudice, however well qualified they were‖ (Amnesty International 2007, 14).  
Certainly, this is not merely a perceived prejudice, as it is a fact that by a 1962 
government decree in Lebanon, more than seventy jobs were considered off-limits 
for refugees until June 2005 when the Minister of Labor lifted the ban on fifty of 
those jobs.  Although this is a slight improvement, one can truly only say that 
with hesitation, as there are still many barriers to Palestinians‘ employability, 
despite efforts by the Lebanese government to coordinate with UNRWA on this 
issue.  First, Palestinians that illegally held certain positions that became 
legalized, had no incentive to regularize their positions because they would then 
be subject to a tax, out of which they would receive no benefits from the Lebanese 
social security system.  Additionally, obtaining work permits for the newly 
permitted jobs is time-intensive and costly, and they are temporary and can be 
revoked at any time, which perhaps explains why since 2005, only a few hundred 
Palestinians have obtained work permits (Amnesty International 2007, 14).  
Secondly, the Ministry of Labor‘s overturn of labor practices in 2005 has yet to be 
passed into law.  Thirdly, Palestinians can still not practice law, medicine or 
engineering, even if the Ministry of Labor‘s decision becomes law.  Also very 
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troubling, as Amnesty International reports, is that ―Lebanese, as nationals, enjoy 
preferential treatment over foreign nationals in terms of access to employment. In 
Lebanon, this differentiation extends to foreign nationals who were born or have 
lived most or all of their lives in Lebanon, most notably Palestinian refugees‖ 
(Amnesty International 2007, 15).  One Palestinian from Burj al-Barajneh told 
Amnesty International: ―Even if you do get a job, Palestinians are paid less. While 
a Lebanese person would be paid US $500-600 as a starting salary, a Palestinian 
would get US $300-400 for the same job‖ (Amnesty International 2007, 15).  
Given this fact, it is clear that there is blatant labor discrimination towards 
Palestinians in Lebanon which not only marginalizes them even more, but also 
poses a challenge for a durable solution for Palestinian refugees living in 
Lebanon.  As AI rightly points out, ―The right to work and rights at work are 
protected in a range of binding international laws to which Lebanon is party.  
According to these standards, Lebanon is required to take steps towards achieving 
progressively the full realization of the right to work for everyone, without 
discrimination, including on the basis of national origin‖  (Amnesty International 
2007, 16).  In particular, Article 7 of the ICESCR states: 
―The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable [sic] conditions of work 
which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:  
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(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal 
value without distinction of any kind, in particular women 
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those 
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work...; 
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;  
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public 
holidays...‖  (UNHCR, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Art. 7). 
Not only is Lebanon obligated to provide standards of living conducive to a 
satisfactory quality of life out of sheer principle, but Lebanon is also party to the 
ICESCR which requires that Lebanon guarantee economic rights even to non-
nationals  (Amnesty International 2007, 16-17).       
Marginalization and Societal Attitudes towards the Naturalization of Palestinians 
in Lebanon  
 One of the most concerning aspects of Lebanese policies towards 
Palestinian refugees is their marginalization, which contributes to 
disempowerment and alienation, and thus, instability for Lebanon, and 
potentially, the region.  According to the International Crisis Group, the core of 
Lebanon‘s refugee policy ―is a powerful, widespread and clear-cut opposition to 
naturalisation [sic] (tawtin).  Refusal of tawtin is enshrined in the constitution‘s 
preamble and has become, in the local jargon, a ‗national constant‘ (al-thawabit 
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al-wataniyya)‖ (International Crisis Group 2009, 13).  The overall sentiment 
towards Palestinian naturalization, or in the case of refugees, permanent 
resettlement, is one of fear and exclusion.  In President Michel Suleiman‘s May 
2008 inaugural address he reaffirmed ―Lebanon‘s categorical rejection of 
naturalisation [sic]‖; a viewpoint embraced by the ministerial declaration that 
reiterated the ―government‘s determination to develop concepts and ideas aimed 
at strengthening Lebanon‘s rejection of naturalisation [sic].  The government 
holds all members of the international community responsible for refugees‘ 
inability to return to their country‖ (International Crisis Group 2009, 13).  This 
stance, however, is primarily rooted in xenophobia and fear of political upheaval, 
as there has been no general consensus as to what tawtin would look like for 
Palestinians.  Some politicians have asserted that naturalization would be 
permanent settlement, while others have warned that it would be a means for 
refugees to acquire citizenship.  For Lebanese, citizenship is a major point of 
contention because of associated voting rights.  This divisive issue has forced 
Lebanese politicians and society to pick a side in the political debate.  Politicians 
wasted no time in politicizing the naturalization rights of Palestinians in light of 
the ambiguity as to what those rights would look like when put into effect by law.  
Concern over citizenship, and therefore, voting rights, stems from the fear that the 
majority Sunni Muslim Palestinian population will upset the delicate balance of 
factional relations in Lebanon.   
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History of Factionalism 
It is this upset of balances that led Lebanon into a devastating civil war 
from 1975 to 1990 that the Lebanese people are not likely ever to forget, 
particularly because Palestinian political violence was cited as a major source of 
escalation of the war.  In 1948 the Arab-Israeli conflict broke out and nearly 
150,000 Palestinian refugees poured into Lebanon.  The majority of refugees were 
Muslim which impacted the delicate confessional balance and acted as a 
destabilizing factor politically.  Ten years later, in 1958, the Christian President 
Camille Chamoun attempted to run for a second term in office, despite the 
prohibition of such in the Lebanese constitution.  Predictably, Muslims and Druze 
were outraged and the country fell into a brief civil war.  Then in 1967, as the 
violence continued between Arabs and Israelis the Six-Day War broke out, and 
the sectarian divide in Lebanon became exacerbated.  The pattern that emerged 
was one in which Lebanese Muslims tended to ally themselves with leftist 
Palestinian refugees, while the Christian population was generally pro-West, 
wealthy, rightist, and highly in favor of maintaining the status quo.  However, as 
the Palestinians became more militant, they eventually formed the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, or the PLO, to which the Lebanese Army was 
sympathetic.  Consequently, PLO operations came out of Lebanon basically 
unchecked, and the result was disastrous for Lebanon.  In 1969, the Cairo 
Agreement was reached, which at the pressure of neighboring countries, required 
Lebanon to comply with the PLO‘s territorial and operational demands in order to 
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launch attacks into Israel.  Even though Lebanon was expected to deal with the 
PLO, countries such as Jordan expelled the PLO in 1970, which created another 
influx of PLO fighters into Lebanon.  At this point in time it became apparent that 
Lebanon had essentially lost control of its political situation in light of the impact 
of outside actors.  At issue in Lebanon, even today, is the influence of these 
outside actors on Lebanese government and politics, as well as the result of 
sectional divide within the country.  The scars of the civil war are still visible in 
Lebanese policies today.  ―Some Lebanese see the refugees as a potential Sunni 
demographic and perhaps even military instrument in the domestic arena; indeed, 
during the civil war, Palestinians were commonly referred to as ‗the Sunnis‘ 
army,‘‖ relays the International Crisis Group (2009, 13).  Nader Hariri, chief of 
staff of Saad Hariri, the most powerful Sunni leader in Lebanon said that 
―historically, Sunnis backed the Palestinians and their desire to wage armed 
struggle against Israel from Lebanese territory.  But that was a mistake, and 
Lebanon emerged weaker‖ (International Crisis Group 2009, 13).  As a result of 
the bitter history of factionalism and conflict in Lebanon, even progressive moves 
forward are met with political challenges.  In 1994, when Prime Minister Hariri‘s 
government granted citizenship to thousands of Palestinians, his political 
opponents argued that he was attempting to bolster the Sunni electorate in Beirut 
and southern Lebanon (International Crisis Group 2009, 13).  In an interview by 
the International Crisis Group with Abu Jaber, an official in Nahr al-Bared with 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 2008 conveyed that refugees 
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have described Lebanon‘s policies as collective punishment for their role in the 
civil war  (International Crisis Group 2009, 18)  ―Lack of hope and the absence of 
a viable economic horizon, together with social marginalisation [sic] and 
exclusion,‖ asserts the International Crisis Group, ―fuel frustration and anger 
toward the state.  Predictably, these also promote militancy and radicalism in the 
camps, increasing the potential for instability and violence‖ (International Crisis 
Group 2009, 18).  Abu Jaber went on to say that ―The state‘s policy toward 
Palestinians is very dangerous for Lebanon.  Radicalism and violence are rising 
among refugees.  The camps are a time-bomb that, sooner or later, will explode, 
with serious consequences for both Lebanese and Palestinians‖ (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 18).  Certainly, it was true of the volatile political climate that 
the refugee camps were becoming unsafe due to ill treatment and a lack of rights, 
and as is presented in the next section, the Nahr al-Bared camp illustrated just 
how dangerous these refugee situations can become.       
A Microcosm of the Crisis: Nahr al-Bared Camp 
Perhaps a microcosm of the negative effects of not ensuring basic human 
rights, protection and security to refugee populations, is the case of Nahr al-Bared 
(درابلا رهن).  Nahr al-Bared is a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, in 
the city of Tripoli.  The camp, which had approximately 32,726 inhabitants, as of 
June 2008 data, (UNRWA 2008) is one of the twelve camps that UNRWA 
operates in Lebanon.  Nahr al-Bared is a crucial example of refugee camp 
instability as a result of the deprivation of rights to an entire population because of 
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the events that occurred on May 20, 2007 in which the jihadist militant group, 
Fatah al-Islam took refuge in the camp, where tens of thousands of civilians were 
residing, after beginning violent clashes with the Lebanese Army (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 11).  The confrontation began in northern Lebanon where 
members of the group were surrounded by the Lebanese Army on suspicion of 
bank robbery.  The fighting quickly spread to the nearby city of Tripoli, outside of 
Nahr al-Bared, where Lebanese soldiers were attacked.  A few hours later, in 
Qalamoun, an army patrol was ambushed.  On the same day, there were 
explosions in the capital of Beirut.  In Tripoli, fighting escalated rapidly as Fatah 
al-Islam members began taking up posts in buildings.  The army and security 
forces responded by raiding buildings that the militants had taken as safe-havens.  
The battle at Nahr al-Bared lasted for over three months and had devastating 
impacts for refugees living in the camps, as well as for the Lebanese Army 
(International Crisis Group 2009, 11). Furthermore, Lebanese-Palestinian 
relations were negatively impacted, putting a strain on the already tension-filled 
relationship (International Crisis Group 2009, 11-12).  By the end of the conflict, 
fifty civilians, 179 soldiers and 226 Fatah al-Islam militants were killed.  
Approximately 6,000 families were displaced, and houses, buildings and 
infrastructure were destroyed, including villages around the camp (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 11).  Apart from the destruction, the social order in the camp 
also collapsed as troops allegedly ―engaged in theft and gratuitous vandalism with 
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impunity, displaying contempt for the local population, all of which caused 
profound resentment‖ (International Crisis Group 2009, 12).    
Debate following the conclusion of the crisis surrounded the origins of the 
extremist group, and whether the group emanated from within the camp or from 
somewhere else.  Official Lebanese statements about the conflict make a clear 
distinction between the jihadist group and the refugees, but many Lebanese still 
pointed fingers at the Palestinian refugees.  One Tripoli resident argued: ―Fatah 
al-Islam was born in the camps.  This is where it was able to recruit hundreds of 
members, arm itself and train, all in the Palestinian residents‘ plain view.  Without 
the acquiescence and complicity of camp residents, it never would have been in a 
position to attack the army.  The war would not have occurred‖ (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 12).  Others have argued that it is quite clear that Fatah al-
Islam did not originate in Nahr al-Bared (Ramadan 2009, 154).  Members of the 
March 14 coalition and some of their Palestinian allies have claimed that the 
group was formed by the Syrian government to destabilize Lebanon, but Syria‘s 
Lebanese and Palestinian allies assert that Saudi Arabia and the Future Movement 
supported Fatah al-Islam in an attempt to counter the Shiite forces in Lebanon, 
such as Hezbollah, and to carry out anti-Syrian operations.  The March 14 
coalition is a parliamentary faction that supports the pro-Western Lebanese Prime 
Minister Fouad Seniora.  March 14 hold a parliamentary majority, it tends to be 
pro-West and anti-Syrian in influence.  Hezbollah, which was founded in 1982 as 
a response to the Israeli occupation of the predominantly Muslim south of 
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Lebanon, has been a destabilizing force in Lebanon.    Hezbollah, meaning Party 
of God, is a Shi‘ite Islamic resistance group and recognized as an international 
terrorist organization by the Department of State.  The organization is funded by 
Iran, which essentially funds Syria as well, making Syria complicit in the political 
entanglement in that Syria allows cash and supplies for Hezbollah to come 
through its borders.  David Aikman asserts that ―Hezbollah, therefore, is 
essentially Syria‘s proxy in Lebanese internal affairs, threatening to disrupt the 
normal process of politics any time that the mood among Lebanese politicians 
seems to be too hostile to Damascus‖ (Aikman 2008, 32).  While the influence of 
Syria and Iran can certainly be regarded as foreign interference, Hezbollah is not 
necessarily regarded as such in the south of Lebanon, which is predominately 
Shi‘ite.  Hezbollah, which is led by its Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, is not 
only respected in the south of Lebanon, but it also carries one hundred and 
twenty-eight seats in the Lebanese Parliament.  In parts of Lebanon, Hezbollah 
provides military support, as well as social services, schools and hospitals.  
Hezbollah‘s ideological goal is to achieve an Islamic republic like Iran, which 
stands in dire contradiction to the goal of democracy in Lebanon (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 11).  Still, others assert that Fatah al-Islam was connected to 
al-Qaeda in Iraq and had been sent to Lebanon to ―form a Sunni jihadist front 
against Israel to rival that of Shi‘ite Hizbullah.  Initially, they were affiliated 
[with] the Palestinian Fateh al-Intifada movement, and were seen in various 
Palestinian camps in the second half of 2006.  After arousing suspicions and being 
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forced out of Burj al-Barjneh and Beddawi camps, they were able to consolidate a 
base in Nahr el-Bared, which had no organised [sic] security committee as did 
other camps.  On 24 November, they announced the formation of a new 
organisation [sic] called Fateh al-Islam, headed officially by Shaker Al-Abssi, a 
Jordanian Palestinian officer in Fateh al-Intifada‖  (Ramadan 2009, 154).  In light 
of the conflict at Nahr al-Bared and the ambiguity surrounding its causes, harsher 
security restrictions were placed on Palestinians, despite their already prison-like 
conditions.   
After the Nahr al-Bared incident, restrictions by the Lebanese Army came 
down hard on the Palestinians.  For the first time since the Lebanese Civil War, 
the army entered a Palestinian refugee camp and ―conducted intensive, at time 
brutal, military operations and sought to impose order‖ (International Crisis 
Group 2009, 12).  Instead of addressing the root causes of the conflict, the 
Lebanese government had done little to aid the Palestinian population.  With the 
rebuilding of a ―new camp‖ through the help of Lebanon and the international 
community, particularly huge donors such as the Saudi Arabian government, only 
about 10,000 had moved to the new camp a year later, as they lacked any source 
of income to make the move.  ―There, families crowd in small areas, live in 
makeshift dwellings and are subject to draconian security measures at the four 
entrances‖ (International Crisis Group 2009, 12).  It is not a matter of whether 
Fatah al-Islam emerged from within the camp, or whether they found a base there 
from disgruntled sympathizers in the Palestinian community, or whether the 
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militant group merely sought haven there due to lax security measures, the main 
point is that a lack of rights and a lack of security go hand-in-hand, and a country 
that cannot ensure stability in its camps, cannot ensure stability for the nation.            
In The Lebanese Army, Oren Barak writes, ―on 3 November 1969, Yasser 
Arafat and AC Emile Boustani signed the Cairo Agreement, which sought to 
satisfy Lebanon‘s demand that its sovereignty and interests be respected while 
guaranteeing the PLO freedom of action in and from Lebanon‘s territory (Frieha 
called this ―a marriage between water and fire‖).  However, in practice, the Cairo 
Agreement legitimized the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon while 
undermining its sovereignty.  This was particularly evident in the refugee camps, 
which become ‗extraterritorial‘ zones managed exclusively by the Palestinian 
factions.‖  In effect, this meant that Lebanon had disengaged from Palestinian 
camps and their factions.  This stance by the Lebanese government put the sole 
burden of camp security on UNRWA to deal with factional violence, making it 
sometimes dangerous to provide services.  However, it is problematic because 
UNRWA is not mandated to provide security services in its camps, meaning that 
areas not secured by the Lebanese government lack appropriate security 
measures.   
 Although UNRWA is mandated to provide services and direct programs in 
Palestinian refugee camps, UNRWA does not run the camp.  According to 
UNRWA, ―UNRWA does not administer the camps but is responsible for running 
education, health, and relief and social services programmes [sic], which are 
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located inside and outside camps. The Agency is not responsible for security or 
law and order in the camps and has no police force or intelligence service. This 
responsibility has always remained with the relevant host and other authorities‖ 
(UNRWA 2010c).  This is an important fact in terms of determining the burden of 
the host country to provide international protection, as previously discussed.  
Refugees are entitled to protection and security in the refugee camp as a safe-
haven.  So, although UNRWA has a strong presence in the camps such as Nahr 
al-Bared, it is essentially the responsibility of the Lebanese government to provide 
security and law and order in the camp to ensure that refugees there are being 
protected in the legal and literal senses.  Thus, it is necessary that Lebanon look at 
the root causes of instability, and ensure ―human security,‖ (an emerging 
paradigm that makes the argument that the security of the person via rights and 
protection, means overall protection for the State), instead of placing harsher 










Contextualizing the Protracted Refugee Situation in Lebanon: Ugandan Efforts of 
Local Integration 
As a way forward, it is essential to draw upon the similarities between 
Lebanon, and a country which has made successful initial attempts at the local 
integration of its refugee population, as in the case of Uganda.  In the cases of 
many PRS, voluntary repatriation and third country resettlement are not viable 
options either because the first country is still not safe for return, or because the 
waiting time for third country resettlement is several years.  In these 
circumstances, local integration is the only viable option for refugees who are 
stuck in PRS.  United Nations Research Paper No. 158 by Alexandra Fielden 
refers to local integration in the country of asylum as a possible solution to 
Protracted Refugee Situations.  Local integration, as a durable solution has three 
steps, asserts Fielden: the legal process that extends additional rights to refugees; 
an economic process that establishes suitable livelihoods and standards of living 
to refugees equitable to the host country‘s nationals; and, a social and cultural 
process in which adaptation and acceptance enable refugees to contribute to 
society without fear of discrimination.  However, argues Fielden, local integration 
can really only be considered a durable solution if a refugee becomes a 
naturalized citizen (Fielden 2008, 1).  Although, the ―broader, multi-dimensional 
definition,‖ used by Karen Jacobsen (2001), suggests that refugees can have those 
three steps fulfilled to enjoy indefinite protection in the host country and live 
there indefinitely without actually becoming a naturalized citizen  (Fielden 2008, 
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1-2).  It is on the basis of this assumption and definition that Fielden makes the 
argument for local integration.     
 Local integration has had positive results for countries with refugee issues 
pertaining to camp protection and security, such as Uganda.  There are various 
reports of camp violence in Uganda perpetrated by the anti-government group 
LRA, discussed earlier, with the support of the Sudanese government.  Like 
Lebanon, Uganda‘s camps have been subject to violence by outside actors which 
has threatened the safety and security of refugees living in the camps, as well as 
national security.  In Uganda, humanitarian relief has been detrimentally impacted 
by the LRA. According to Human Rights Watch, ―Other LRA abuses include 
disruption of humanitarian relief work in the north. This work addresses three 
separate populations: the Sudanese refugees in Uganda (an estimated 170,000 
who are fleeing government or SPLA abuses, or both); Uganda civilians forced 
into or willingly in ‗protected camps‘ created by the Ugandan army, the Uganda 
People‘s Defense Force (UPDF); and the OLS cross-border relief operation, 
which uses Ugandan roads to deliver relief into southern Sudan for the internally 
displaced Sudanese there. All three programs have been jeopardized by LRA 
ambushes and land mines, another area in which the two countries‘ conflicts 
overlap‖ (HRW 1998).  The UPDF reportedly created the camps to protect 
civilians from the LRA, but others have argued that the camps were established to 
deny the LRA of civilian support, a counterinsurgency tactic.  Many civilians 
willingly moved to the camps to seek protection, but others had to be forced or 
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intimidated to move by the UPDF. According to the Geneva Conventions, a 
government that displaces civilian populations must ensure satisfactory conditions 
of shelter, hygiene, healthcare, safety and nutrition, per Article 14, Protocol II.  
Admittedly, the UPDF had not ensured any of these standards, making a lack of 
clean water and food, disease, overcrowding and inadequate security from LRA 
attacks commonplace in civilian camps in Uganda (HRW 1998).   Furthermore, 
Uganda is also a party to the Refugee Convention.  In 2002, the LRA was 
responsible for great violence against refugee camps, including in Achol-Pii camp 
of Sudanese refugees where aid workers from the International Rescue Committee 
were kidnapped (IRC 2002).  Rebels apparently took control of Ugandan tanks 
and used them on refugees and Ugandan troops, according to reports by the BBC.  
There are countless reports in the media of extreme and brutal violence 
perpetrated by militant groups, such as the LRA, against humanitarian workers, 
refugees, and civilians.   
 Uganda, like Lebanon, has been dealing with a Protracted Refugee 
Situation and camp violence.  As a solution to this ongoing crisis, Uganda has 
looked to local integration.  In 1999, the UNHCR began work with Uganda on an 
assistance strategy focused on self-sufficiency for Sudanese refugees who had 
been in Uganda since 1988 (Fielden 2008, 10-11).  ―The goal,‖ writes Fielden, 
―was to promote refugee self-sufficiency and also to integrate refugee assistance 
into national systems of development‖ (Fielden 2008, 11).   The program also 
sought to eliminate parallel and education services, to integrate refugees into the 
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local economy and to enable them to achieve self-sufficiency (USCRI 2004, 49).  
As a means of facilitating self-sufficiency, the Ugandan government gave 
provisions of land to refugees, which they could use to yield crops to sell given 
that Uganda allowed refugees free access to the employment market, which 
included the right to sell produce in local markets.  Even though refugees were 
not granted entirely free movement, the economic freedoms they were given was 
a step in the positive direction.  As recently as 2008, Ugandan authorities had 
drafted a refugee bill that addressed issues such as taxation and freedom of 
movement and employment.  The Jesuit Refugee Service in Uganda runs schools 
in some of the refugee settlements that serve refugee and local children, which is 
conducive to integration for the next generation (Fielden 2008, 11).  Fielden 
writes, ―An interesting dimension in the case of Uganda is the government‘s 
realistic approach to the refugees.  Authorities recognized the diminished donor 
interest in funding a protracted refugee assistance program, and also that self-
reliant refugees would cost less in food and other support services.  Ugandan 
officials also noted that programs targeting both refugees and locals would 
encourage support from development agencies such as the World Bank and 
UNDP.  The Ugandan example thus provides a good model for local integration, 
especially in light of progress being made despite national security problems‖ 
(Fielden 2008, 11).  Although there is much work still to be done to fully address 
the needs of refugees in Uganda, it is a positive example for countries like 
Lebanon that face substantial security concerns as a result of Protracted Refugee 
 76 
Situations.  As has been illustrated, only through the full realization of rights and 
protection of refugees, through local integration or another durable solution, can 





















Areas for Further Research  
 There are various theoretical lenses through which the issue of PRS can be 
analyzed, with several different angles in which the topic can be approached.  
Trauma theory, for example, is an expansive realm that certainly applies to the 
Palestinian refugee narrative.  For Palestinians, their struggles have centered on 
far more than displacement; their narrative is about complete devastation and loss.  
The crisis that forced Palestinians into exile in 1948 is known as al nakba, 
meaning the ―catastrophe‖ or ―disaster,‖ and that is the character of the 
Palestinian refugee experience.  In The Empire of Trauma: an inquiry into the 
condition of victimhood, Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman write that 
contemporary refugees differ from those of past centuries in that they are in far 
larger numbers, they are dramatically removed from civil society, the duration of 
their displacement is extraordinary, and they have become a ―crucial element in 
the make-up of national and international political entities‖ (Fassin and Rechtman 
2009, 253).  Fassin and Rechtman relay the growing importance of mental health 
in the occupied territories and its role in bearing witness to the trauma taking 
place among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.  Given the constant daily 
struggles faced by Palestinians, signs of trauma as a result of continuous 
oppression and violence are prevalent among Palestinian adults and children.  
Thus, demonstrations of trauma among Palestinians can give an account of the 
violence of war and also the conditions in camp life.  Fassin and Rechtman relay 
that the legitimacy of the term refugee has shifted since World War I, making 
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refugees now subject to greater scrutiny and suspicion than ever before.  Today, 
refugees‘ claims are evaluated on the basis of truth and accuracy, rather than 
humanitarianism, and the dependency upon physical proof or evidence to 
substantiate one‘s claims, (for example, scars to prove a well-founded fear after 
having been tortured) has surpassed refugee testimony.  However, there is a need 
for increased emphasis on psychic scars, such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) to validate the claims of trauma for refugees.  In this way, for Palestinian 
refugees, ―Trauma then offers not a last resort in the absence of physical wounds, 
but a significant added value in the construction of testimony‖ (Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009, 197).  Therefore, a highly interesting area deserving of more 
attention is that of the power of trauma in Palestinian camps to serve as testimony 
to the world, which could potentially affect change in their circumstances and 
shed light on the issue of trauma as a result of displacement, forced migration, and 
violence, particularly among children.      
 Another interesting perspective on the issue of PRS is that of biopower, 
and the state‘s political and legal determinations (such as refugee status) as a form 
of politics and of control over the lives of individuals living in refugee camps. 
Both Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault, to name a couple, have very 
interesting work on this topic, which can be applied to camp life for refugees 
living in PRS.  In Foucault‘s work, The History of Sexuality in the first volume, 
The Will to Knowledge, he introduced the term ―biopower.‖  Foucault‘s approach 
to PRS would be to analyze the ways in which life itself in refugee camps is used 
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to orientate and drive political policies (Foucault 1978).  This is a relevant 
direction for future research, as the containment of refugees and the attempt to 
control a population or group‘s very presence and limit its participation in the 
political arena is, in effect, a poignant example of biopolitics and the exercising of 
biopower.   
 Agamben, on the other hand, takes Foucault‘s work in another direction in 
Homo Sacer, asserting that the world is characterized by ―the separation between 
humanitarianism and politics‖ (Agamben 1998, 144).  In his work, Agamben 
argues that biopower is about more than the generative type of power production 
that Foucault discusses.  For Agamben, biopolitics is about the control of ―bare 
life,‖ or simply being alive, by the sovereign power.  The sovereign‘s control of 
bare life, therefore, brings life itself into the political realm, which excludes some, 
and not others, from bios, or full life.  This differs from Foucault‘s thesis in that it 
claims that there is a distinct link between biopower and sovereignty, which is to 
say that the sovereign‘s integration of biopolitical power and the political sphere 
are at a historical apex, bringing to light their juxtaposition.  Bare life, then, is left 
out of bios for certain groups as a means of politicizing their very existence.  In 
the case of refugees living in the camps, this is a powerful realization.  In these 
circumstances, refugee populations and the conflict that caused their exile become 
politicized by isolating them to bare life, which then subjects their existence to the 
sovereign‘s control and politicization as a result of their exclusion from the state 
and civil society.  Fassin writes, ―If refugees occupy a crucial space in the 
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biopolitics…today, their collective treatment does not rest on the separation of the 
‗humanitarianism‘ from the ‗political,‘ but on the increasing confusion between 
the two, which consequently redefines the contemporary signification of the 
camp‖ (Fassin 2005, 367-368).  The camp, therefore, is the conflict between 
politics and life, made tangible, at the expense of the physical and civic lives of 
refugees.   
 Fassin, Rechtman, Foucault and Agamben all convey highly relevant and 
fascinating theses for future inquiry into the issue of Protracted Refugee 
Situations and their implications.  PRS are not only about the containment of 
individuals in a state of humanitarian crisis and conflict, but signify the dilemma 
between human rights and biopolitics, which is embodied by the refugee camp.  
The camp is not only a container of physical exclusion of individuals from the 
state, but also their citizenship, and their civic and legal existence.  This is an area 
deserving of further research and analysis, as politics and life become increasingly 
integrated in the modern global society.  As this reality has severe implications for 
human rights and refugee protection, it is essential to look at these issues from 
varying theoretical lenses as a means of bringing about change among sovereign 
states in the international community to ensure that their administration over the 





Conclusion, with Recommendations 
As discussed throughout the paper, there are legal frameworks in place to 
protect refugees and to ensure their rights.  Current literature draws a connection 
between a lack of rights and protection from violence and upheaval in refugee 
camps, which is supposed to be a sanctuary for civilians, and yet, it is all too 
frequently not.  In the Refugee Survey Quarterly, a UNHCR document entitled, 
―The Security, Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and 
Settlements Operationalizing the ‗Ladder of Options,‘‖ reasons are outlined for 
the international community to focus on the issue of security in refugee camps.  
As an area of growing interest, it is crucial to examine these developments.  The 
first development is the changing nature of conflict, in which there are ―internal 
and regional wars generating cross-border movements of mixed groups, including 
military elements‖ (UNHCR 2000).  The second issue involves ―A recognition 
that the militarization of refugee camps, armed attacks on such settlements and 
other forms of insecurity in refugee-populated areas are likely to undermine 
public and political support for the institution of asylum and the principles of 
refugee protection‖  (UNHCR 2000).  As we have seen, this sentiment has already 
taken root in Lebanon, which poses a challenge for Palestinian refugees to find 
any durable solution to their plight there, particularly ―local integration,‖ which is 
one of the UNHCR‘s durable solutions, and yet, seems implausible for Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon so long as Lebanon maintains its current exclusionary 
policies.  Thirdly, the UN recognizes that ―The proven danger that the 
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militarization of refugee-populated areas can create or aggravate tensions between 
States, thereby posing a threat to regional peace and security; and,‖ lastly, that 
―The prevalence of lawlessness in some refugee-populated areas, manifested in 
levels of crime, banditry and violence which pose a serious threat to the security 
of refugees, local populations and humanitarian personnel‖ (UNHCR 2000).  All 
of these issues are major areas of concern for any host country or neighboring 
country to a conflict because of the far-reaching consequences of mass 
populations of refugees crossing international lines.  These issues are crucial 
because they are relevant to human rights, state sovereignty, and the security of 
the state.  What used to be considered a purely humanitarian issue, is being given 
due attention by scholars, policymakers and intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the United Nations, but even more needs to be done.   
Although there are no overarching statements that can apply to all 
conflicts around the world, it can certainly be said that there is a strong 
connection between a lack of human security – rights, personal safety and a 
standard for quality of life – and the root causes of conflict leading to refugee 
crises.  When refugee crises occur, it has far too frequently been the case that host 
countries, who do not intend to become a resettlement country for refugees and 
who are overburdened by the economic and security concerns associated with an 
influx of refugees, will marginalize the refugee population by restricting their 
movement, their rights, and their overall freedoms by limiting them to the 
confines of the camp.  However, instead of ensuring state security and the 
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economic status quo, keeping refugees in these conditions leads to a debasement 
of rights, a poor quality of life, and thus, serious security and human rights 
concerns.  If the refugee population is the product of an ongoing or extended 
crisis, their confinement, which is akin to imprisonment, has the potential for 
becoming a Protracted Refugee Situation in which refugees can wait in limbo for 
extended periods, without due protection and rights afforded to them by 
international norms and treaties.  These circumstances breed conflict and can act 
as a catalyst for the politicization of refugee inhabitants who serve as bases of 
support for radical, militant groups.   
Lebanon was used as an example to illustrate the clear link between a lack 
of human security and a lack of state security.  The Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon have not only been confined to camps for over sixty years, but remain in 
dire conditions, with a lack of rights and a loss of political, electoral or societal 
efficacy.  There are countless reports, many of which have been cited here, that 
demonstrate the disheartening and intolerable conditions that Palestinians are 
subject to in Lebanon.  In the case of Lebanon, the treatment of Palestinians is 
rooted in an argument for security.  Going back to the devastating Lebanese Civil 
War from 1975-1990, Palestinian politics were seen as having a substantial role in 
the chaos and destruction that took place.  Now, twenty years later, at the time this 
paper was written, Palestinians are socially and economically marginalized in 
Lebanon on the basis of claims to security and discriminatory sentiments by 
society and some factions of the government.  Yet, this marginalization and 
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seclusion did not serve to protect Lebanese society at large, or the government 
from harm.  In the events that culminated in the clashes at Nahr al-Bared, civilians 
were killed, soldiers of the Lebanese Army were killed, infrastructure was lost, 
and Palestinian refugees were displaced, losing everything.  As a result of 
Lebanon‘s policies towards Palestinian refugees, it did not protect the state, but 
did just the opposite, putting refugees in harm‘s way, despite being a population 
in Lebanon that was in most of need of protection, yet suffered the most.   
Furthermore, Lebanon has continually deferred its responsibility to care 
for Palestinian refugees in its territory because it does not intend to serve as a 
resettlement country, and because it has evaded responsibility in light of the UN 
mandate that established UNRWA to provide services in Lebanon‘s twelve 
Palestinian camps.  However, as has been established by international norms and 
treaties, Lebanon has an obligation to care for all persons inhabiting its territory.  
According to international customary humanitarian law, there are standards of life 
that are to be provided to refugees, being that they are civilians, which includes 
shelter, hygiene, health, safety, nutrition, and the right to keep family units 
together at all costs.  Moreover, as a party to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Lebanon has further binding obligations to 
provide for basic standards to Palestinians without prejudice. 
These facts beg the question of state responsibility to protect civilians of a 
state – refugees or nationals – because it is required of international and 
humanitarian law.  What is the call to action for states hosting refugees?  
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Specifically, many scholars have tried to address the responsibilities of the state to 
protect.  Given the lack of government protection and involvement that has been 
previously discussed in the case of Lebanon, it is important to clearly define the 
duties of the sovereign state, which includes far more than just the provision of 
bare life.  Corliss offers some support in this regard when he writes that ―The 
question of asylum State responsibility for the violent subversive acts of foreign 
exiles is unsettled in significant respects.  States have vigorously condemned such 
attacks and, through United Nations General Assembly resolutions, have 
repeatedly recognized the existence of an active duty of prevention, except where 
self-determination is at issue.  …  The extent of disregard for the norm in practice, 
however, makes it difficult to assert that the duty has attained the status of 
customary international law‖  (Corliss 1990, 181-182)  With regard to Nahr al-
Bared, and the events that occurred there which put thousands of lives in danger, 
it is clear that states need to do more to prevent the hostile acts of non-state actors 
and to quell such violence wherever it occurs and to recognize the necessity of 
such action so as to raise it to the level of customary international law.  In 
particular, Lebanon should be more vigilant in maintaining security and order in 
refugee camps, but not at the expense of refugees, to ensure that non-state actors 
are not able to take root and garner support in those camps in its territory as a 
result of inadequate services and a lack of rights.  Regardless of UNRWA‘s 
mandate, Lebanon must exercise influence on all of its frontiers and ensure that it 
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is meeting its legal and international obligations to Palestinians, if not on 
humanitarian grounds, then at least on the basis of state sovereignty and security.   
If rights are the basis of addressing the humanitarian needs of Palestinians 
in Lebanon and some of the security concerns for the Lebanese government, then 
rights are where Lebanon must begin.  The assurance of rights for refugees begins 
with the ratification of the Refugee Convention.  Therefore, Lebanon ought to 
ratify the Refugee Convention and implement its provisions into national law to 
ensure that the basic needs of all refugees living in Lebanon are fulfilled.  
Furthermore, more support by the Lebanese government needs to be directed 
towards UNRWA.  UNRWA camp territories have remained virtually the same 
size, despite population growth over several decades, which means that the 
Lebanese government should consider expanding camp territory to ensure a better 
quality of life, particularly with regard to housing and sanitation. UNRWA is also 
in need of more financial support, as it operates on the voluntary contributions of 
the international community.  Being that refugees are being hosted in Lebanon, 
and Lebanon has international and treaty obligations to protect them, it would be 
in Lebanon‘s best interest to ensure great quality of services by contributing more 
resources to UNRWA in Lebanon‘s field offices.   
Finally, paramount to maintaining peace and security in Lebanon, as well 
as respecting the human rights of Palestinian refugees is the gradual dismantling 
of refugee camps towards the goal of local integration.  The local integration 
initiatives in Uganda are illustrative of the viability of implementing local 
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integration in a country with severe security concerns, such as Lebanon.  
Sudanese refugees, who had been in Uganda since 1988, were given sections of 
land by the Ugandan government to produce crops that could be integrated into 
the local economy.  This level of inclusion, namely, economic, was conducive to 
alleviating the PRS in Uganda.  Such a solution could work for Lebanon where 
Palestinian refugees are excluded from meaningful participation in the economy, 
whereas, active participation would make Palestinians stakeholders in the 
Lebanese state, and therefore, make it in their interest to keep Lebanon safe, 
meaning that militias and insurgent groups would experience waning support in 
Lebanon, and therefore, have no base to launch future attacks.   
Integrating Palestinians into the national economy in Lebanon will be 
challenging, given the history of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, and the societal 
attitudes towards Palestinian integration or naturalization.  However, the 
Palestinians have been in Lebanon for decades, and there is no indication that this 
will change in the near future.  Therefore, it is in the interest of the Lebanese 
government and its people to locally integrate Palestinians and extend rights to 
them that are currently only afforded to Lebanese nationals.  This will take 
substantial advocacy efforts and lobbying of the Lebanese factions of the delicate 
confessional system there.  Although, advocacy should not stem from the pro-
Palestinian or pro-Sunni factions in Lebanon, as it has already been demonstrated 
how any efforts to extend rights to Palestinians by those factions can lead to 
political division and infighting, as it is perceived as favoritism or a political 
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scheme to disrupt the demographic and electoral balance in Lebanon.  Thus, 
advocacy must stem from civil society.  While there is a strong sentiment of fear 
and apprehension in Lebanon on the issue of Palestinian refugees, there is also 
international outcry elsewhere, on the unjust situation for the Palestinians.  
Furthermore, much of that fear is perpetuated by the politicization of the issue, 
which is really a human rights issue.   
Lebanese society, particularly the students and the future generation of the 
country, have the ability to influence policy calling for an increase in human 
rights, better living conditions and integration into society and the economy for 
Palestinians.  If politicians understand that future generations are concerned about 
the issue of Palestinian refugees and the camps in Lebanon, then that will rise to 
the political agenda and it will further it as an issue of national importance as a 
human rights issue, and not a purely political issue.  Additionally, humanitarian 
organizations in Lebanon that actively work with the refugee population, and 
often times collaborate with UNRWA, have an important role to play in terms of 
mobilizing efforts to extend human rights to Palestinians.  These organizations see 
the day-to-day struggles, and can be incredibly influential if they could present 
their daily challenges to Lebanese officials and make strong arguments for the 
connection between rights, and peace and security.  In particular, due to the 
history and negative sentiment towards foreign interference in Lebanese affairs, it 
is crucially important that local NGOs, or non-governmental organizations engage 
with Lebanese society and the government.  Also, as has already been asserted, 
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the assurance of Palestinian rights can work to stabilize Lebanon, making it a 
foreign policy goal for the United States to engage with Lebanon and the United 
Nations on this issue, as Lebanon has been an important player in U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East for decades.  Through the U.S. Department of State‘s 
contributions to UNRWA, many projects and services have been delivered to 
assist Palestinians, resulting in favorable outcomes, however, the U.S. has the 
ability to influence policy in Lebanon, and it would be an enormous milestone for 
such a shift to take place.  Together, the youth, the students, the humanitarian 
organizations, the NGOs, and the international community can work 
collaboratively to ensure human rights for Palestinians, as well as peace and 
security in Lebanon.          
In the case of Lebanon, we have seen the detrimental impacts of planning 
for a short-lived crisis, rather than a Protracted Refugee Situation, as Kuhlman 
would assert.  Countries should not view refugee crises as temporary situations in 
which it is not necessary to extend the rights granted to nationals to refugees 
because of the perceived brevity of their stay.  Rather, each refugee population 
should be granted many basic rights, which have previously been discussed, at the 
outset of their refuge in a host country.  When refugee crises are not initially 
properly addressed, it may lead to instability at a later point.  Therefore, host 
countries, such as Lebanon, must ensure that durable solutions are made possible 
for refugees.  If that durable solution does not include permanent resettlement, 
and certainly a state is entitled to reserve that right, then it must include the full 
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provision of rights and services as required by international treaties and 
conventions.  In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees have lived in UNRWA camps for 
decades, and as stateless persons, do not have the option of voluntary repatriation 
if they are to maintain their Palestinian nationality, meaning that Lebanon must 
ensure durable solutions for Palestinians.  Many Palestinians work in Lebanon, 
although they are still held back from certain positions.  Even though Palestinians 
live and work in Lebanon, they are not recognized as full citizens, nor are they 
given the rights that Lebanese nationals are granted.  The reasons for this, as has 
been discussed, are highly politicized and deeply rooted.  However, in order for 
Lebanon to meet its obligations to Palestinian refugees and to enjoy peace and 
security where they live, it is necessary for Lebanon to move towards the 
economic, social and legal integration of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the 
gradual dismantling of camps.  It is through these means that Lebanon can ensure 
the human rights and security of all individuals living in Lebanon, to live without 
fear based upon race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion, which are protections deserved not only by all 
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